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Chapter One: The Development of Social Movement Unionism and 
Alternatives to the NLRB System
Introduction
 Disarray swells the ranks of the American labor movement, at least according to the 
media and general public.  While organized labor continues to suffer drastic declines in private 
sector unionization rates, unions have developed several organizing strategies that provide 
American workers with some hope.  From community organizing to alliances with 
environmental groups--a phenomenon unheard of three decades ago--the labor movement has 
begun to transform into a social movement that no longer lags behind progressive politics.  
Unions have experimented with a variety of strategies to halt significant membership decline.  
Some labor leaders and experts believe that unions need to allocate more resources to innovative 
organizing strategies, while others argue that unions need to return to a servicing model that 
focuses on maintaining existing contracts to prevent the complete destruction of the labor 
movement.
 In this paper, I intend to confront major issues regarding contemporary union strategy and 
the rejection of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) process that has governed labor 
relations since 1935.  I will discuss the role that strategic research and corporate campaigns play 
within both organizing drives and contract negotiations.  Strategic corporate research, an element 
of social movement unionism that has received minimal attention in academic literature, is used 
by unions to identify major sources of leverage against a company and integrate these pressure 
points into a larger corporate campaign.  Corporate campaigns define a set of tactics used to 
pressure key decision-makers at multiple levels and develop leverage beyond traditional 
strategies, such as the strike.  The importance placed on such campaigns has extended over the 
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past decade as a result of failures related to organizing through the NLRB process, yet many 
unions still place insufficient resources into these aggressive strategies.  
 I argue that strategic research and corporate campaigns enhance union strategy in three 
ways.  First, strategic research unveils key decision-makers that often remain obscured through 
complex corporate structures.  Second, strategic research and multifaceted campaign tactics 
allow unions to escalate pressure on key decision-makers beyond the workplace.  Third, strategic 
campaigns enable unions to remain one step ahead of employers and force management on the 
defensive.  No blueprint exists for strategic campaigns, which allows researchers and 
campaigners to devise creative tactics that management cannot predict.  Strategic research and 
corporate campaigns are fundamental components of union strategy to match corporate power 
and revitalize the American labor movement.
   In this chapter, I will argue that American unions have adopted more strategic tactics as 
a result of specific developments within political economy and labor law.  While strategic 
research and corporate campaigns are not a magic pill to cure all problems, they serve as a 
central mechanism to achieve unionization outside of the failed NLRB structure.  The NLRB 
consists of the state-created structures formed in 1935 that institutionalized American labor 
relations.  After briefly describing the origins of the American labor movement, I analyze the 
institutionalization of labor law at the national level and the development of a Fordist political 
economy.  I then discuss the crisis of Fordism and how the rise of neoliberalism makes the labor 
law system ineffective for unions today.  I analyze the labor law system to show why unions 
need to look for alternatives to the NLRB to maintain strong density levels.  Finally, I conclude 
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the chapter with an analysis of developments in union strategy and show how strategic research 
and corporate campaigns have become essential organizing and bargaining tactics.
Historical Development
 Many scholars argue in the name of “American exceptionalism” that the American labor 
movement never developed much institutional power and failed to foster a strong socialist 
tradition like its European counterparts.  Historian Mike Davis argues persuasively that the U.S. 
did develop a militant labor movement in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, but 
American workers were continually divided along racial and ethnic lines, which remained less 
prevalent in European countries.1  Waves of immigration in the late-nineteen and early twentieth-
century, combined with rural-urban African American migration, created ethnic and racial 
identities that American labor organizations constantly had to overcome to forge a class-based 
movement.  While these ethnic and racial divides persisted, unions built on grassroots discontent  
and made enormous organizing gains during the Great Depression.  The militancy and grassroots 
nature of these organizing drives stemmed in part from the lack of federal labor laws and general 
repression of workers’ rights by companies and the state. 
The Development of Fordism and the Institutionalization of Labor Law
 The American labor movement underwent significant change in the 1920s and 1930s as a 
result of transformations in political economy and the creation of a national labor law system.  
Similar to other industrialized countries, the United States began to develop a Fordist political 
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1 Mike Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the U.S. Working 
Class (New York: Verso, 1986), 41-42.
economy that emphasized increased productivity and the standardization of industry.  Henry 
Ford’s management over his automobile company inspired the naming of the Fordist system.  
Ford was responsible for two innovations--the assembly line and the five dollar day--that define 
a Fordist political economy.  The assembly line describes the relative monotony of the labor 
process of Fordist manufacturing shops, in which workers repeat a single task and management 
often imposes Taylorist policies to extract greater value and profit.  The five dollar day allows for 
the mass consumption that accompanies the mass production developed by assembly line labor.  
Fordism requires high levels of consumer demand to purchase manufactured goods, which Ford 
developed through high wages.  
 Fordism also necessitates a labor-management accord that avoids class conflict through a 
tripartite relationship among the state, corporations, and unions.  While the United States did not 
develop an elaborate corporatist labor relations system evident in countries such as Sweden and 
the United Kingdom, the introduction of national labor law in 1935 developed a federal system 
governing class relations.  As Katherine Stone explains, “[i]ndeed, for most of the twentieth 
century, the law and the institutions governing work in America have been based on the 
assumption that workers were employed in stable jobs by corporations that valued long-term 
attachment between the corporation and the worker.”2  The dependency of capital for a stable 
labor force necessitated a system like the NLRB.  However, as explained later, this system began 
to falter once capital no longer desired tight internal labor markets.
 Fordism created a labor relations system based on compromise and tradeoffs that both 
employees and management accepted.  Workers--especially those employed in industrialized 
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2 Katherine Stone, From Widgets to Digits: Employment Regulation for the Changing Workplace (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 121.
industries such as steel, coal, and automobiles--received benefits such as job security, higher 
wages, and grievance procedures under a Fordist economy.  All of these benefits derived from 
high levels of unionization in these industries.  Unionization also benefited management by 
providing for stable labor force who consumed the products they produced.  In exchange for 
material benefits, workers and unions gave up significant control over the assembly line labor 
process.  
 The Harry Braverman-Michael Buroway debate presents two different viewpoints on the 
extent of workers’ agency in the Fordist manufacturing workplace.  Braverman argues that 
employers develop complete control over the workplace by deskilling labor through the 
separation of conception from execution.3  Burawoy refutes Braverman through a case study 
analysis that shows that workers play games on the shop-floor and maintain agency from 
managerial prerogatives.4  While the Braverman-Buroway debate remains unsolved and is 
beyond the scope of this paper, it is sufficient to say that, while some workers developed agency 
in the Fordist manufacturing plant, employers often traded material benefits for ultimate control 
over the labor process.
 The labor movement exerted enough pressure on the national government during the 
Great Depression to force the passage of the National Labor Relations Act--also called the 
Wagner Act--in 1935.  The Wagner Act created the NLRB and a national system of institutions 
governing labor relations.  The development of national labor law empowered workers to 
organize into unions by creating procedures for organizing drives and collective bargaining 
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3 Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).
4 Michael Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979).
negotiations.  NLRB organizing drives involve several processes.  First, nonunion employees 
who desire greater workplace protection contact a union.   Organizers then gauge employee 
support to discern whether the union has majority backing.  A union can petition for an NLRB 
election with support from at least thirty percent of the potential bargaining unit.  If majority 
support is present, the union may inform management and request that the employer recognize 
the union as the legitimate bargaining agents of the workforce.  Management generally decides to 
refuse recognition and opts for an NLRB-regulated election.  While the NLRB legally protects 
the rights of workers to express views and support unionization, management maintains an 
inherent advantage through easy access to the workforce to promote an antiunion ideology.  
NLRB elections share many similarities with political elections, as votes are cast in private and 
both union and management lobby to persuade workers.5  The union needs to receive 50% plus 
one to win the election.  Problems associated with this NLRB election process receive attention 
later in this chapter.
 While unionization rates soared in the decade following the Wagner Act, a newly elected 
Republican Congress of 1946 overrode President Harry Truman’s veto and passed new labor law 
legislation that continues to reverberate to the present day.  The Taft-Harley Act of 1947 
amended and weakened some of the more progressive union rights evident in the Wagner Act by 
introducing new procedures into labor law.  Among a variety of amendments, Taft-Hartley 
prevented the use of secondary boycotts or wildcat strikes, purged Communists from unions and 
the NLRB, and enabled the development of Right-to-Work laws.  For this paper, the most 
essential component of Taft-Hartley regards the limitations the act places on certain union 
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5 James J. Brudney, “Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Labor 
Relations Paradigms,” American Constitution Society (February 2007): 12-13.
organizing strategies, namely secondary boycotts and strikes.  Taft-Hartley continues to force 
unions to rely on and work within the NLRB structure by placing severe limitations on other 
organizing tactics, such as pressuring employers into union recognition through consumer 
boycotts.  While the effects of Taft-Hartley were not felt right away--as unions continued to 
maintain high density rates throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s--the Act began to 
significantly hurt unionization during the onslaught of neoliberalism beginning in the late-1970s.
The Rise of Neoliberalism and the Ineffectiveness of the NLRB
 Beginning in the late-1970s, dramatic transformations in political economy strongly 
influenced the development of American labor relations.  The economic stagnation of the 1970s--
deemed the failure of Keynesianism and Fordism--led to the formation of an economic ideology 
centered around privatization and flexibility.  Neoliberal ideology equated democratization with 
marketization and led to a significantly reduced role of state welfare programs.  British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher and American President Ronald Reagan developed institutionalized 
neoliberal policies on the political level.  For his part, Reagan contributed significantly to the 
decline of American unionism when he invoked aspects of Taft-Hartley to fire striking air traffic 
controllers in 1981.  Reagan’s actions sent a cue to employers throughout the nation to take a 
more activist approach towards labor relations.  The structural changes brought about by 
neoliberalism and globalization--including capital flight and the development of complex 
corporate structures--also severely weakened American unions, most of which remained 
completely unprepared for rapid structural change.
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 Transformations in corporate structure and managerial practices, strongly related to 
neoliberalism and globalization, contributed significantly to the decline of union density.  
Corporate emphasis on flexible employment, instead of stable internal labor markets, led 
management to de-unionize and reorganize workplaces.  Neoliberal ideology undermined and 
actively denied the role of unions as partners to manage labor unrest and maintain labor market 
stability.  Despite evidence provided by numerous studies showing that “union victory in an 
NLRB representation election has no effect on establishment survival,”6 employers increasingly 
value flexibility and complete control over their workforce, even if material realities remain the 
same regardless of union presence.  Corporations eliminated unions through tactics such as 
outsourcing and took advantage of a growing antiunion establishment in Washington, as the 
NLRB no longer protected workers’ rights to the same extent as during the immediate post-war 
era. 
 The NLRB has failed to adapt to contemporary political and economic realities.  
Prominent labor law scholar Julius Getman argues that the NLRB creates imbalances with regard 
to access, coverage, and delay.7  Employers effectively prevent union organizers from accessing 
workplaces and discussing issues related to unionization with employees.  During an organizing 
drive, management often meets with employees to discuss the benefits and costs of unionization, 
obviously emphasizing the latter.  While Getman argues against the perceived negative effects of 
employer intimidation on unionization success, the imbalance evident with regard to access 
clearly shows how such intimidation potentially plays a key role in dissuading workers against 
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6 Ruth Milkman and Kim Voss, eds., Rebuilding Labor: Organizing and Organizers in the New Union 
Movement (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 13.
7 Julius G. Getman, Restoring the Power of Unions: It Takes a Movement (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2010), 179.
forming a union.  Labor organizers inherently maintain less access to workplaces than 
managers.8  
 Another problem with the NLRB system relates to coverage and the shrinking definition 
of what constitutes an employee.  Emphasis on employer flexibility has led to an increase in 
temporary work and the redefinition of employees into “independent contractors.”  Not only does 
temporary work--or the common practice of shorter and more frequent work shifts--inhibit 
unionization, such temporary workers and independent contracts are barred from NLRB 
coverage.9  In addition, the more narrowed definition of an employee has transformed nurses and 
other similar occupations from workers into supervisors, thus barring them from union eligibility. 
The complete restructuring of the term “employee” forces unions to work outside the NLRB 
process when attempting to organize such workers.
 Assuming a union succeeds through the NLRB process, an election victory does not 
automatically yield a contract.  Even when workers vote to organize, a union needs to bargain 
with management over contract provisions.10  During this lag period, the company does not 
recognize the union.  While federal labor law maintains procedures that supposedly lead to quick 
contract negotiation after a union’s election victory, these mechanisms often go unenforced and 
require the union to engage in a costly contract campaign to force the employer to agree to a fair 
contract.  The failure of the NLRB to adapt to changing circumstances, such as the rise of 
neoliberalism, unbalanced access to workers between employers and union representatives, and 
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8 Getman, Restoring the Power of Unions, 183.
9 Getman, Restoring the Power of Unions, 184-5.
10 Getman, Restoring the Power of Unions, 110, 199.
limited mechanisms to force contract negotiation, force unions to adopt innovative organizing 
strategies to combat increased employer aggressiveness.
Development of Union Strategy 
 Union strategy has developed as a response to changes in political economy, corporate 
structure, and labor law.  Labor academic Tom Juravich explores how the political economy of 
different eras influenced organizing strategy.  At American Woolen in Lawrence, Massachusetts, 
workers organized by the radical International Workers of the World (IWW) engaged in the 
famous Lawrence textile strike of 1912.  The IWW determined that a strike was the most fitting 
form of resistance, evident in the use of strikes to halt production and solve labor disputes during 
the time period as a result of no institutional involvement in labor relations by the state.11
 Union strategy evolved as a result of corporate and institutional transformations.  For 
example, the United Autoworkers (UAW) selectively struck General Motors (GM) at its Flint, 
Michigan plant in 1937.  Unlike American Woolen, GM operated multiple national plants, which 
allowed the union to engage in a selective strike.  The UAW utilized corporate research and 
analyzed pressure points to determine which plant to strike.  The union’s strategy developed 
within the context of hundreds of militant organizing drives in the wake of the 1935 Wagner 
Act’s recognition of the right to organize.12
 After the institutionalization of labor law in 1935, unions began to develop a mutually 
beneficial relationship with capital and the state to mediate labor relations.  While strikes and 
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11 Tom Juravich, “Beating Global Capital: A Framework and Method for Union Strategic Corporate 
Research and Campaigns,” in Global Unions: Challenging Transnational Capital Through Cross-Border 
Campaigns, edited by Kate Bronfenbrenner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 20.
12 Juravich, “Beating Global Capital,” 21-22.
organizing drives remained commonplace in some instances, the era between 1935 and 1975 
heralded labor-management cooperation.  Union strategy focused on organizing and maintaing 
contracts through the NLRB system.  Unions also recognized the development of corporate 
structure, which strongly influenced strategic decision-making.  Established industrial firms like 
United Steel maintained numerous national and international plants and developed a more 
comprehensive corporate structure than American Woolen in 1912 or GM in 1937.  Unions 
recognized that selective strikes work less effectively in these more expansive industries, and 
instead responded to developments in corporate structure and labor law through pattern 
bargaining.  For example, the United Steelworkers (USW) bargained with employers in every 
firm within an industry, thereby organizing entire industries instead of single plants.13  Many 
employers also desired this pattern bargaining and thereby helped organize for unions--although 
this phenomenon was more common in Western European countries.  The development of the 
NLRB enabled such expansive pattern bargaining.  Corporate profitability and management 
emphasis on stability, rather than flexibility, also led to high unionization rates.
 The rise of neoliberalism and the ineffectiveness of the NLRB rapidly debilitated 
organized labor and required a new approach to unionism.  Unions were slow to respond to these 
transformations, as most labor leaders still emphasized an outdated servicing model that relied on 
the NLRB and labor law to maintain union strength.  John Sweeney ascended to the presidency 
of the AFL-CIO in 1995 on a platform that emphasized organizing, organizing, and more 
organizing.  Sweeney led the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) through a 
tremendous growth phase between 1981 and 1995, and sought to expand the successful emphasis 
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on organizing throughout the entire labor movement.  Some unions, especially more progressive 
grassroots unions in the service sector, shifted to a strategy that allocated more resources to 
organizing during the 1980s, with a realization that a strictly servicing model would lead to the 
rapid destruction of the labor movement.  The emphasis was placed on unionizing new workers 
through the existing NLRB structure, as many labor leaders believed at the time that the failures 
of unions to organize--instead of the ineffectiveness of the NLRB process--remained at fault for 
organized labor’s downfall.
  Organizing through existing federal structures proved difficult.  Faced with intense 
employer opposition to unionization and the structural effects associated with globalization, the 
NLRB system no longer provided unions with enough institutional support to organizing and 
bargaining efforts.  Without a change in labor law, the outdated NLRB system forced unions to 
adapt and work outside of existing federal institutions.  For example, the Hotel Employees and 
Restaurant Employees (HERE14) completely abandoned the NLRB process and relied solely on 
card check recognition by the late-1990s.15  Card check substitutes for the NLRB process and 
occurs when a majority of workers in a firm check authorization cards affirming a desire for 
union representation.  An employer needs to agree to bypass the NLRB process described earlier 
and recognize a union based on card check.16  Unions often develop corporate campaigns to 
obtain neutrality agreements between an employer and a union, which sometimes leads to card 
check recognition and a quick first contract.  
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14 HERE has since merged with UNITE to form UNITE HERE.
15 Getman, Restoring the Power of Unions, 101.
16 Brudney, 12-13.
 The term social movement unionism encompasses the new emphasis on organizing 
through alternatives to the NLRB system.  This social movement unionism differs with business 
unionism, in which unions allocate most resources to servicing current union members instead of 
organizing new workers.  The social movement approach contains two different models, both of 
which remain necessary for unions to reclaim power.17  The worker-centered approach--which 
has received the most attention in academic literature--refers to an increased dedication to 
grassroots empowerment of both union and nonunion members to take matters into their own 
hands.  This approach calls for more union democracy and militancy.  The other model--often 
referred to as the leverage-based approach--emphasizes strategic research to develop 
multifaceted campaigns that pressure employers beyond the workplace.  In contrast to the 
worker-centered model, the leverage-based approach highlights the importance of paid union 
staff to discover points of leverage and develop a campaign against a company.  While elements 
of these two models remain necessary to develop union power and comprehensive corporate 
campaigns, obvious tensions--such as the importance of union democracy--exist.  My research 
will focus on the leverage-based component to social movement unionism, but I plan to 
problematize these tensions throughout the paper.
 
Strategic Research and Corporate Campaigns
 Two struggles in the 1960s and 1970s laid the foundation for developments in union 
strategy that centered around strategic research and corporate campaigns.  While most labor 
academics consider the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) late-1970s 
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17 Kim Voss, "Democratic Dilemmas: Union Democracy and Union Renewal,” Transfer: European Review 
of Labor and Research, 16 (August 2010): 371.
successful organizing drive against J.P. Stevens as the first corporate campaign, the César 
Chávez-led Farmworkers’ movement implemented many strategic tactics that forced grape 
growers to the bargaining table.  The United Farmworkers (UFW) approached the Great Delano 
Grape Strike of the late-1960s in many similar ways as contemporary unions that operate under 
the guise of social movement unionism approach organizing drives today.  Because agricultural 
workers receive no protection under the NLRB, the UFW could only bring about unionization 
through creative pressure tactics.  While the UFW was forced to work outside of the system, 
many progressive unions today elect to work outside of the NLRB structure and therefore rely on 
campaigns that pressure the target employer.  
 The UFW developed a two-tier approach that focused on maintaining solidarity amongst 
a largely immigrant workforce and created strategic tactics that pressured grape growers on a 
national scale.  On the front lines, the UFW associated the struggle with a variety of symbols in 
Mexican culture that the farmworkers connected with.  The use of vigils, community centers, and 
a three-hundred mile march from Delano to Sacramento maintained solidarity and supported 
workers throughout the strike.18  From a strategic standpoint, the UFW relied extensively on 
creative and confrontational pressure tactics.  This emphasis on experimentation and innovation 
remained essential for the movement.19  For example, the UFW developed a consumer boycott 
throughout the United States by sending inexperienced organizers--most of whom had never left 
California--to cities throughout the country to pressure major distribution centers and chain 
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Farm Worker Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 151-52.
19 Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 135, 140-41.
grocery stores from selling California grapes.20  Through creativity and experimentation, the 
boycott succeeded and played a large role in forcing grape growers to recognize the UFW as the 
farmworkers’ formal bargaining representative.
 ACTWU staffer Ray Rogers developed the first widely-recognized corporate campaign, 
which sought to pressure key J.P. Stevens’ board members into accepting unionization.  Rogers 
connected Stevens’ board members with other prominent organizations and pressured the target 
firm indirectly through these associations.  For example, Rogers connected several board 
members with key positions in Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company and enlisted the support 
of other unions to threaten to withdraw pension funds from Hanover.  After Rogers made several 
other associations between the Stevens’ board and other key financial institutions, the company 
finally conceded to union demands in 1980.21  He showed that, by pressuring key decision-
makers, unions can force companies to the bargaining table.  However, Rogers’ tactics have not 
represented a universal cure for organized labor.
 The UFW boycott and Rogers’ corporate campaign show that union strategy needs to 
focus on developing strategic campaigns that leverage companies on multiple fronts.  The 
transnational nature of many firms necessitates the development of multifaceted corporate 
campaigns that rely on strategic research to identify sources of leverage.  Strategic research and 
corporate campaigns remain the only ways to combat transnational corporations because unions 
need to unveil key decision-makers and pressure these firms beyond the site of the workplace.  
While comprehensive corporate campaigns have achieved success in several instances, the 
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20 Susan Ferriss and Ricardo Sandoval, The Fight in the Fields: Cesar Chavez and the Farmworkers 
Movement (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1998), 128.
21 Tom Juravich and Kate Bronfenbrenner, Ravenswood: The Steelworkers’ Victory and the Revival of 
American Labor (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 69-70.
enormous amount of resources and time required make many labor leaders skeptical of the value 
of corporate campaigns, especially since many of these campaigns have failed.
 The potential costs of undertaking a comprehensive campaign appear obvious, but data 
show that strategic tactics associated with multifaceted campaigns play an extremely large role in 
union success rate.  Prominent labor organizing academics Kate Bronfenbrenner and Robert 
Hickey show through regression analysis that union strategy matters.  Bronfenbrenner and 
Hickey make a list of ten strategic campaign tactics, and present data which shows that the 
presence of five or more of these tactics significantly improves a union’s chances at winning an 
NLRB election.22  The authors’ analysis focuses only on NLRB elections.  Based on this data, the 
authors conclude that union strategy is the single most important determinant of election 
outcome.  Many labor leaders, organizers, and scholars who have lived through and studied the 
decline of American unionism may--and perhaps rightfully so--dispute Bronfenbrenner and 
Hickey’s claims.  However, there remains little doubt that union strategy represents an extremely 
important determinant in election outcome.  As the authors state, “unions cannot wait--for labor 
law reform, for a more favorable economic climate, or more favorable political environment-- 
before they begin to utilize this more comprehensive, multifaceted, and intensive strategy in all 
of their organizing efforts, inside and outside the NLRB process.”23  
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22 Kate Bronfenbrenner and Robert Hickey, “Changing to Organize: A National Assessment of Union 
Strategies,” in Rebuilding Labor: Organizing and Organizers in the New Union Movement, eds. Ruth 
Milkman & Kim Voss (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 29.
23 Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, “Changing to Organize,” 55.
Conclusion
 Unions need to adapt to dramatic transformations within political economy, corporate 
structure, and labor law.  Strategic research and corporate campaigns play large roles in the 
revitalization process.  Neoliberalism continues to operate as both a practical reality and 
ideological agenda.  Corporate structure has become more complicated as more firms expand 
internationally.  Corporate ownership and other key decision-making actors no longer remain 
very clear as companies diversify.  Moreover, corporations continue to invest in anti-union 
consulting firms that further widens the resource discrepancy between unions and management.  
The failure of the NLRB to adapt to the changing political and economic contexts force unions to 
develop innovative methods of exerting pressure on companies to organize more workers.  If 
union strategy fails to respond to these diverse changes through more sophisticated organizing 
approaches, worker power will undoubtedly continue to falter.  
19
Chapter Two: Analysis of Organizing Win Rates and Implications
 Over the past three decades, several unions have adopted innovative and creative 
strategies in an effort to revitalize the labor movement and organize more workers.  While a few 
unions have experienced growth in membership, the overall unionization rate--especially in the 
private sector--continues to spiral downwards.  In this chapter, I will explore statistics on both 
NLRB election activity and card check procedures.  I also analyze determinants of organizing 
success and union renewal, as innovative tactics related to strategic research and corporate 
campaigns often play large roles in these efforts.  Despite aggressive anti-union strategies and a 
hostile economic context, union strategy plays an extremely large role in determining organizing 
success rates.  Finally, I will analyze the necessity of top-down organizing processes--such as 
strategic research and corporate campaigns--in conjunction with the grassroots mobilization 
tactics often attributed to social movement unionism.  Numerous progressive service sector 
unions have adopted more aggressive campaign strategies, but not all adhere to the bottom-up 
model that many activists and scholars advocate and associate with social movement unionism.
Organizing within the NLRB
 The National Labor Relations Act created institutions that serve to regulate organizing 
drives and collective bargaining.  As shown in the last chapter, while unions successfully pursued 
organizing through the NLRB system for several decades after its formation in 1935, employers 
began to exploit weaknesses in the system to combat organizing drives and decertify existing 
unions.  The NLRB has failed to advance the right to organize within the context of globalization 
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and corporate emphasis on flexibility.  While the majority of unions still utilize the NLRB in 
some capacity, many unions now opt to work outside of federal institution to organize workers.
 As Figure 2.1 indicates, unions organized through the NLRB process to varying extents 
between 1940 and 1999.  NLRB elections increased rapidly in the early-1940s and early-1950s 
and maintained a general upwards pace through the mid-1970s, before decreasing significantly in 
the early-1980s.  The number of NLRB elections split in half between 1980 and 1985.  
Employers pursued aggressive action against organized labor, especially after Reagan fired the 
air traffic controllers in 1981, and unions were forced to allocate many resources to defending 
against decertification campaigns.  NLRB election rates stabilized after 1985 through 1999.
Figure 2.1 Number of NLRB Certification Elections 1940-199824
 Despite significant declines in the quantity of NLRB elections, union victory rate did not 
change significantly during the 1980s.  Figure 2.2 shows that union win rates have declined 
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24 Henry S. Farber and Bruce Western, “Ronald Reagan and the Politics of Declining Union 
Organization,”  (Working Paper #460, Industrial Relations section, Princeton University, December 2001), 
3.
steadily since a wartime high of around 85% and reached below 50% by the mid-1970s.  If 
anything, win rates have increased since the mid-1970s, and hovered around 50% by 1999.  A 
major factor adding to the ineffectiveness of the NLRB under neoliberalism relates to first 
contract rates.  Labor law expert James Brudney cites two quantitative analyses from the 1980s 
and 1990s that show that successful first contract negotiation occurs in approximately 60% of all 
union NLRB victories.25  Combine this figure with the sub-50% win rate to begin with, and less 
than one-third of workers attempting to form a union through the NLRB actually became 
unionized in the 1990s.
Figure 2.2 Union Win Rates in NLRB Election 1940-199926
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26 Farber and Western, “Ronald Reagan and the Politics of Declining Union Organization,” 4.
 Recent data indicates that organizing through the NLRB has significantly faded over the 
past decade.  Statistics on NLRB representation petitions and elections are readily available on 
the agency’s website.
 Figure 2.3 NLRB Petitions and Elections held between Fiscal Years 2004 and 2013.27
 
 These statistics show a general decrease in the amount of petitions filed and elections 
held between 2004 and 2013.  Nearly 1,000 less elections were held in fiscal year 2013 than in 
2004.  The statistics also indicate a slight increase in NLRB election win rate over the past 
decade.  Many unions have abandoned the NLRB process and now rely more heavily on card 
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check, and/or unions no longer organize as much as they did a decade ago.  While the possibility 
that unions now organize even less than they did a decade ago requires more research and 
presents a frightening prospect, it appears safe to conclude that at least some unions now 
organize more heavily outside of the NLRB.     
 Quantitative research shows that--even within organizing campaigns operating through 
the outdated NLRB system--union strategy plays a significant role in determining success rates.  
Bronfenbrenner has released several quantitative studies that prove the importance of union 
tactics.  In one study of 261 NLRB election campaigns from 1986-1987, she shows that variation 
in union tactics is the single most important determinant in election outcome.28  A study released 
in 2004 by Bronfenbrenner and Hickey further supports the importance of union strategy.  This 
analysis controlled for election background, bargaining unit demographics, company 
characteristics, and employer opposition.  The most remarkable analysis pits employer strategies 
against union strategies.  When the employer uses five to nine tactics and the union only uses 
five or fewer tactics, union win rate stands at 35%.  Conversely, when the employer uses five to 
nine tactics and the union uses more than five organizing tactics, the win rate jumps to 93%.29  
The number of these “comprehensive organizing tactics”30 utilized by unions obviously acts as a 
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30 Bronfenbrenner and Hickey identify and use ten tactics that they argue “are critical to union organizing 
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large determinant of organizing success rate.  While some scholars may argue that these results 
deemphasize changes in the global economy and fail to explain why unions are not adopting 
these strategies on a widespread level, few can argue that unions remain helpless to reverse 
declines in membership rates. 
Card Check Organizing
 Unfortunately, data on card check organizing success remain very limited.  Several 
progressive service sector unions use card check as their major, and in some cases only, method 
to organize workers.  Card check occurs when a union enters a workplace and gets a majority of 
workers to sign cards--generally in a public group setting--indicating preference for joining the 
union.  This method substitutes for an NLRB secret-ballot election, which is more prone to 
employer intimidation.  Organizing through card check often, but not always, involves a 
neutrality agreement, which is an agreement signed by the union and management stating that 
the employer will remain neutral if the union gives something in return, such as a promise not to 
develop a corporate campaign.  
 Neutrality agreements allow unions and employers to regulate organizing drives outside 
of the restrictions posed by the NLRB.  Most neutrality agreements arise out of union reliance on 
employer neutrality during an organizing drive and management’s desire to restrict aggressive 
union tactics.  As Brudney writes, “the self-regulated regime under neutrality and card check is 
predicated on a pre-commitment to restraint: both labor and management agree not to injure the 
reputation of their opposite number.”31  In a study by scholars Adrienne Eaton and Jill Kriesky, 
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almost all neutrality agreements guaranteed employer commitment to neutrality and union access 
to employees at work.  Around eighty percent restricted aggressive union behavior.  Finally, 
about two-thirds included card check provisions, which enabled an organizing drive that avoided 
the NLRB election process.32  As discussed in the next paragraph, the card check provision 
represents a major determinant of union success rate.  Neutrality agreements have come under 
attack over the past couple of decades, but still remain an essential organizing tool for many 
unions.  The Supreme Court heard arguments for a case that could have decided the fate of 
neutrality agreements--which would have had far-reaching consequences for modern 
organizing--but decided to drop the case in December 2013.33  
 Research on non-NLRB organizing drives remains minimal, but several studies show that 
card check provides a more effective way to organize workers than the NLRB.  Unlike NLRB 
records, no government agency keeps track of every card check organizing campaign.  Some 
interest groups, such as the AFL-CIO’s Work in Progress reports and the Center for Employee 
Rights, have maintained records for these campaigns, but these records are incomplete.  The first 
and most comprehensive study of card check organizing was released in 2001 by Eaton and 
Kriesky, who quantitatively analyzed 118 card check agreements.  Major findings include that 
card check reduced legal and illegal management tactics and enabled unions to obtain employee 
lists.34  A large majority of cases also required certification by a neutral third party, which helps 
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substitute for the lack of regulatory oversight over card check campaigns.  Most important for 
this paper, Eaton and Kriesky discovered that win rates of card check agreement with neutrality 
approach 80%, which is significantly greater than NLRB victory rates.35  They also discovered 
that neutrality-only agreements without card check provisions produced the same win rates as 
NLRB elections.36  Card check provisions need to accompany neutrality agreements to produce 
higher win rates, which further exposes the weaknesses associated with the NLRB election 
process.  One of the most important statistics concerned first contract negotiation rates.  
Successful negotiation of first contracts occurred in nearly 100% of the cases studied.  As Martin 
Jay Levitt’s classic Confessions of a Union Buster shows and data from earlier in this chapter 
indicate, the NLRB process fails to force employers to negotiate a contract, even after a 
successful organizing campaign.37  Card check virtually ensures contract negotiation.
 Unions obviously benefit from card check arrangements, but employer motivations for 
entering such agreements appear more complicated.  Multiple studies argue that basic economic 
rationality leads many employers to agree to card check arrangements.  Employers sometimes 
believe that costs incurred through collective bargaining are offset by the benefits gained.  Such 
benefits include “advantages in marketing products or services to unionized firms... assistance 
from unions in lobbying for favorable legislative or regulatory outcomes... promote a more 
cooperative stance by unions.”38  For example, the recently dropped Supreme Court case 
involved UNITE HERE and a Florida casino, in which the neutrality agreement included a 
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provision that the union would spent $100,000 to politically lobby on behalf of the casino in 
exchange for neutrality and card check procedures.39  
 Employers also use neutrality agreements and card check campaigns to regulate union 
behavior.  The threat of corporate campaigns plays a large role in an employer’s cost-benefit 
analysis to enter into a neutrality agreement.  Eaton and Kriesky explain that “card check 
agreements that limited union attacks on employers produced significantly fewer union victories 
than those that did not curtail use of this tactic.”40  Based on these statistics and common logic, 
employers will obviously want to limit aggressive union strategy as part of a card check and/or 
neutrality arrangement.  While nearly eighty percent of neutrality agreements include restrictions 
on aggressive strategy, unions benefit from keeping these tactics on the table.  
 Eaton and Kriesky argue in a more recent article that “corporate campaigns are not a 
frequently used strategy to secure neutrality and/or card check” and “no more than a handful of 
the agreements we have studied involved corporate campaigns.”41  They cite that unions use the 
threat of work stoppage as the major source of leverage when struggling for neutrality and/or 
card check arrangements.  While corporate campaigns may not provide the foundation for 
achieving neutrality--likely because most unions do not actively utilize corporate campaigns--
either the threat of aggressive union tactics or actual use of these tactics remain a major driving 
force behind an employer’s decision to accept and negotiate the terms of neutrality.
28
39 Barnes, “Supreme Court Drops Case.”
40 Eaton and Kriesky, Union Organizing under Neutrality and Card Check Agreements, 53.
41 Adrienne Eaton and Jill Kriesky, “No More Stacked Deck:  Evaluating the Case Against Card-Check 
Union Recognition,” Perspectives on Work, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2003): 19-20.
 Congress came somewhat close to institutionalizing card check through the Employee 
Free Choice Act (EFCA) in 2007 and 2009, but the legislation failed to receive a supermajority 
in the Senate.  EFCA would have benefitted unions in three ways.  First, EFCA would enable 
union recognition through card check and eliminate the process of intimidation prevalent in 
NLRB secret-ballot elections.  Second, if union and management fail to agree to a first contract 
within ninety days, a neutral arbitrator would ensure the formation of a fair contract.  Third, 
employers would face fees for intimidation of workers attempting to invoke union rights.42  
Scholar Bruce Nissen uses a case study approach to determine the potential effectiveness of 
EFCA for an organizing drive at a Florida nursing home that suffered defeat as a result of union-
busting tactics.  Nissen argues that EFCA provisions would have definitely helped nursing home 
workers form a union through card check provisions, but also shows that employers could 
challenge worker signatures and take the organizing drive through the lengthy NLRB process.  
Furthermore, employers may justify the financial consequences of antiunion activity to prevent 
unionization.43  EFCA undoubtedly promotes a more friendly organizing environment, but the 
legislation would not sole every problem associated with union-employer relations.
Which Unions Implement Comprehensive Organizing Strategies?
 Despite quantitative analyses proving the importance of comprehensive organizing 
strategies, few unions consistently implement the tactics described earlier by Bronfenbrenner and 
Hickey.  Those unions that utilize these tactics tend to operate outside of the NLRB structure and 
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rely on neutrality agreements and card check to organize more workers.  Bronfenbrenner and 
Hickey show that only UNITE, HERE,44 and SEIU averaged four or more comprehensive 
organizing tactics during a campaign during the period under study.  Many older, industrial 
unions--such as the Steelworkers and the Teamsters--averaged two or fewer comprehensive 
tactics during organizing campaigns.45  This analysis indicates that most of the unions utilizing 
comprehensive tactics organize within the service sector, while more traditional unions in the 
manufacturing and transportation sectors have failed to adopt more strategic tactics.  The data is 
over a decade old, but little evidence suggests that progressive service sector unions have 
abandoned these strategies or that more traditional unions have greatly expanded use of these 
tactics.  
 The same unions that implement comprehensive organizing strategies appear most likely 
to develop corporate campaigns.  In a briefing book to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
academic Jarol Manheim documents analyzed fifty-seven corporate campaigns between 2000 
and 2005.  Twenty-eight of the campaigns listed involved UNITE, HERE, UNITE HERE or 
SEIU.46  Other organizing-focused service sector unions (UFCW and CWA) and progressive 
public sector unions (AFSCME) made up a large component of the remaining campaigns on the 
list.  The USW and Teamsters also appear on the list multiple times, but service sector unions 
undoubtedly undertake a large majority of corporate campaigns in the twenty-first century.  
While Manheim’s list does not follow a precise quantitative methodology, he lists campaigns in 
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which “companies are targeted without respect to their size, location, industry or prominence”47 
and there is little reason to suspect that he favors listing certain corporate campaigns over others.  
The two largest practitioners of corporate campaigns--UNITE HERE and SEIU--are arguably the 
two unions most associated with social movement unionism.  These unions also remain at the 
center of debates surrounding the most appropriate and effective way to organize workers.
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Unionism
 The debate on union democracy and its relationship to union renewal has generated a 
significant amount of scholarly attention over the past couple of decades.  These debates relate 
strongly to the perceived importance of strategic research and corporate campaigns within union 
strategy.  The thrust of social movement unionism came from activists and academics who 
argued that the decline of the labor movement resulted from bureaucratization and an emphasis 
on servicing existing members, rather than organizing new recruits.  The return of unions to their 
social movement roots--namely through grassroots empowerment of both union and nonunion 
workers and a shift to an organizing model--is seen as the cure to decades of decline.  While 
many case studies show the importance of a greater bottom-up approach to unionism, union staff 
play a large role in devising and implementing comprehensive organizing strategies.  Top-down 
tactics support grassroots renewal.  Many unions require a certain amount of centralization--
distinct from the bureaucratization of business unionism--to place more resources into organizing 
and developing more strategic tactics.  In this context, centralization implies efficient 
organizational structure change to bring about more effective organizing models, while 
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bureaucratization implies stagnation.  Social movement unionism requires a combination of top-
down and bottom-up processes.
 Several qualitative and quantitative studies argue that union staff and national unions 
more effectively bring about a shift to social movement unionism tactics than enhanced union 
democracy.  Obvious support for this argument relates to the fact that existing members have less 
to gain in the short-run from reallocating resources from servicing to organizing.  How can 
scholars expect the rank-and-file to instigate progressive change when their immediate material 
interests align more with business unionism?  In Robert Hickey, Sarosh Kuruvilla, and Tashlin 
Lakhani’s analysis of of thirty-two case studies of organizing campaigns in the U.S. and U.K., 
they start from the foundation that “decades of research... suggest that most voluntary 
organizations have a core of activists and a large number of free-riders.  Empirical studies also 
show that member activism in unions remains weak at best.”48  Hickey et. al’s findings suggest 
that while bottom-up processes were sometimes a major contributor to organizing success, 
“union member activism is neither consistently necessary nor consistently sufficient for union 
renewal.”49  Conversely, the role of paid union staff remained essential in all successful case 
studies.
 Andrew Martin’s quantitative study of seventy union locals between 1990 and 2001 
shows that professional staff have more freedom to divert resources to organizing because they 
remain insulated from the rank-and-file.  In this argument, union staff--as opposed to elected 
leaders or the rank-and-file--represent the most activist element of unions, which supports the 
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theory that top-down processes enable a shift towards implementing social movement unionism 
practices.50  Martin also shows that “the total union disbursements controlled by the elected 
officials has a strong positive effect on organizing success outside the NLRB.”51  Martin’s study 
suggests that professional staff plays a large role within NLRB campaigns, and elected leaders 
play an especially large role in non-NLRB campaigns.  In conclusion, union leaders and staff 
often shift resources to organizing and strategic tactics.
 National unions sometimes play a large role in revitalizing union organizing by forcing 
local unions to shift resources from business to social movement unionism practices.  Voss and 
Sherman’s analysis of fourteen locals in three different national unions found that 
“transformation took place most often in locals where a crisis opened the door to greater 
intervention by change-oriented national leaders.”52  Bottom-up pressures were not responsible 
for initiating change in the transformation of any of these fourteen locals.  Martin’s study also 
shows that greater influence of national unions led to the adoption of social movement tactics at 
the local level.  While this evidence suggests that increased centralization and greater 
involvement of union staff leads to a shift of resources to organizing and other social movement 
practices, such analysis relies on the foundation that union leaders are both progressive and risk-
taking actors.  
 The distinction between the bureaucratization of business unionism and the centralization 
of social unionism relates to the distribution of resources to servicing or organizing models.  Top-
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down processes may fail unions in which leaders still adhere to business unionism practices.  
Furthermore, many tactics associated with social movement unionism--such as aggressive 
corporate campaigns--could potentially ruin a union economically or politically.  A corporate 
campaign represents a costly endeavor--especially if an employer files a successful law suit 
against the union--that often proves unfeasible for a local union.  Support from the national union 
is generally required to enable locals to pursue strategic organizing tactics.  Corporate campaigns 
have also resulted in political crises within unions between national leaders and militant 
locals.5354  
 Some unions have reigned in noncomplying locals through a trusteeship, which enables 
national staff to replace local leaders.  A report by longtime organizer Steve Early states that the 
SEIU placed forty locals--14% of its affiliates--into trusteeships between 1996 and 2004.55  The 
use of trusteeships may force a local union to devote more resources towards organizing, but 
often these tactics shade centralization into bureaucratization.  If a national union places a local 
in a trusteeship because of perceived militancy, aggressive organizing, or a desire to assert 
centralized control, the union acts against the grassroots empowerment associated with social 
movement unionism. 
 The evidence presented in the last few paragraphs support the argument that paid union 
staff and tactics that extend beyond the workplace remain essential for shifting resources to 
organizing and winning campaigns.  While successful organizing requires union staff, this 
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argument does not ignore the importance of rank-and-file mobilization.  Organizing drives and 
contract campaigns quickly become irrelevant without solidarity and activism amongst the 
workers directly involved.  In the contemporary economic climate with modern corporate 
structure, bottom-up activism needs to coincide with top-down processes.  Union staff need to 
effectively pressure key decision-makers beyond the workplace, as decision-makers often remain 
far removed from the employer directly involved in the organizing struggle.  UNITE HERE’s 
model--which most scholars consider worker-centered, but also involves a large amount of union 
staff researching and campaigning--effectively combines rank-and-file activism with corporate 
campaigns.  This model will receive more in-depth attention in chapter four.  Unions need to 
utilize and intersect both top-down and bottom-up processes to organize successfully in the 
twenty-first century.
Conclusion
 The NLRB process no longer provides effective mechanisms for organizing workers in 
the contemporary era.  Many unions have recognized the ineffectiveness of the NLRB and now 
implement more strategic tactics to organize workers through card check recognition.  Brudney 
remarks that “the AFL-CIO reported that its affiliates organized nearly three million workers 
from 1998 to 2003, less than one-fifth of these newly organized employees were added through 
NLRB elections.”56  While many of these new workers consisted of public sector employees 
organized through processes outside of the NLRB or card check, unions undoubtedly rely less on 
institutionalized structures to organize workers.  The rapid rise of card check has coincided with 
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a heightened interest and application in leverage-based tactics that enable alternative forms of 
union organization.  The next chapter will focus on strategic research and corporate campaigns as 
mechanisms to facilitate neutrality agreements and card check arrangements.  These leverage-
based tactics are necessary to organize workers and reverse union decline.
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Chapter Three: Moving Beyond the Workplace--Strategic Research and 
Corporate Campaigns
Introduction
 The rise of neoliberalism, the ineffectiveness of the NLRB, and transformations within 
corporate structure weaken traditional approaches to organizing.  Unions need to undertake 
strategic research to uncover decision-makers concealed behind intricate corporate structures.  
The development of corporate campaigns intends to leverage companies from a variety angles 
beyond the shop floor.  Strikes no longer remain effective as a potential source of leverage or 
tactic to pressure management in the twenty-first century.  Unions need to devise innovative and 
creative tactics that target employers on multiple levels.
 In this chapter, I will analyze the various theoretical approaches to strategic research and 
corporate campaigns that both academics and unions advance.  I will then problematize these 
innovative union strategies through four case studies.  The theoretical approaches differ in some 
ways, but all emphasize the need to unveil key corporate decision-makers, escalate pressure on 
management beyond the workplace, and develop a creative and multifaceted campaign that 
places the employer on the defensive.  Most important, there exists no correct way to “do” 
corporate campaigns.  As the case studies show, these campaigns largely depend on specific 
contexts, and researchers engage in creative and experimental thinking to pressure employers 
through unpredictable means.  Strategic research is an “art form”57 in many ways, as researchers 
do not adhere to a blueprint and are forced to think creatively in a variety of contexts.  
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Theoretical Approaches  
 Very few academics, and even fewer unions, have produced literature concentrated on 
strategic research corporate campaigns.  Most labor academics focus on the grassroots activism 
and coalition-building aspects of social movement unionism.  Few analyze the other component 
of social movement unionism, which concerns leverage-based tactics like corporate campaigns.  
A few unions, most prominently the SEIU, have released pamphlets explaining union-specific 
approaches to corporate research.  However, unions face the threat of legal action when 
publicizing information related to corporate campaigns, which has limited the amount of material 
made public about such research.  
 The most contemporary material on approaches to corporate campaigns build on  
analyses of past case studies.  These theoretical approaches do not represent an effort to broadly 
theorize on different modes of strategy that unions could use to achieve certain ends.  Rather, the 
models that follow were created directly out of an analysis of campaigns that already occurred 
and tactics that succeeded versus those that failed.  Labor academic Tom Juravich developed a 
comprehensive model to strategic campaigning from studying campaigns such as the UFW and 
Ray Rogers’ victories to understand which tactics work in practice.  Juravich’s model remains 
very broad in the sense that he incorporates just about every tactic that unions have used during 
an organizing or bargaining campaign.  Similarly, the SEIU developed a manual on contract 
campaigns from direct experiences.
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Central Components
 Unions abide by general guidelines when undertaking strategic research and corporate 
campaign.  First, unions need to utilize and intersect bottom-up and top-down organizing tactics.  
Second, unions need to implement strategic tactics that pressure the firm from both a financial 
and reputation standpoint.  Third, employers combat and regulate corporate campaigns through 
lawsuits, which forces unions to cautiously escalate campaigns.  While unions devise campaigns 
largely based on the specific context they face, these guidelines apply in virtually all cases.  
 As stated in chapter two, unions need to combine and intersect “bottom-up” and “top-
down” approaches into both organizing and contract campaigns.  Bottom-up tactics involve 
maintaining worker solidarity and providing workers with more control over the decision-
making process.  The top-down, or union staff, element intends to pressure the employer beyond 
the workplace.  Bottom-up and top-down strategies are not necessarily isolated during the 
campaign.  For example, researchers often rely on workers to provide information about a 
company’s products that is not published anywhere.  The bottom-up and top-down processes 
often intersect to produce a two-tier struggle that enhances the probability of success for any 
campaign.
 Corporate campaigns generally utilize two broad types of tactics--financial and 
reputation--that pressure firms in essential and distinct ways.  Financial tactics aim to directly 
disrupt the business operations of the targeted firm.  Campaigners use these tactics in the hope of 
costing the firm enough money to pressure decision-makers into accepting a neutrality agreement 
and/or card check provisions.  Strategies that affect the financial status of the firm are the most 
widely used tactics in corporate campaigns, but sometimes these tactics fail to effectively 
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pressure companies.  Campaigners cannot assume that a target firm’s decision-makers will 
respond to union tactics through a rational choice lens.  Many firms accept steep financial costs 
to maintain flexibility and a sense of control over operations.  Tactics that expose illicit or 
morally questionable activity by the target firm--referred to here as reputation tactics--add to the 
multifaceted nature of a comprehensive campaign.  An ideal tactic both weakens the firm 
financially and exposes negative aspects of the firm’s reputation.  
 The use of aggressive tactics entails certain costs, which presents unions with obstacles to 
implementing leverage-based campaigns.  Just as organizing campaigns must abide by NLRB 
regulations, corporate campaigns face certain constraints.  Limitations on corporate campaigns 
are not institutionalized through a regulatory body like the NLRB.  The major obstacle unions 
face when implementing corporate campaigns concerns the threat of legal action.  Employers 
love to sue, especially because they possess more financial resources than unions.  Lawsuits 
represent the primary means through which employers combat strategic campaigns.  Companies 
often accuse unions engaging in corporate campaigns with fraud, claiming that specific 
researchers published false statements that damages the firm’s reputation.  Any court case costs 
money and shifts the attention of organizers and researchers away from the campaign, but unions 
face especially substantial damages if found liable of illegal tactics.  Legal threats serve to 




 Juravich has produced the most comprehensive work on strategic corporate research in 
his article “Beating Global Capital: A Framework and Method for Union Strategic Corporate 
Research and Campaigns.”  He argues that developments in corporate structure have forced 
transformations in union strategy throughout the twentieth century, and unions need to continue 
adapting to dynamic circumstances.  He explains the process of strategic research and how this 
research is transformed into a campaign.  Strategic campaigns need to target key decision-makers 
and utilize external relationships to pressure corporate actors.
 Juravich systematically explains how a strategic researcher identifies key leverage points 
and develops a comprehensive campaign.  Campaigners need to first research the specific 
industry and corporate structure of the firm at hand.  As seen in figure 3.1, Juravich identifies 
twenty-four major research areas grouped into three categories.  The first category--Command & 
Control--focuses on the firm’s key decision-makers.  Major decision-makers go beyond 
management, and often include shareholders, lenders, and the parent company if the firm at hand 
is a subsidiary.  The second category--Operational--concerns the firm’s supply and production 
chain.  For example, if the targeted firm operates in the retail business, researchers need to 
discover the origin of the firm’s goods, the distributors and transporters that supply the firm with 
these goods, and information about consumers.  Operations also include details about the 
workplace and employees.  Information about company production and supply networks are 
often very difficult to find online, which makes workers the best source for such information.58  
The third category--Outside Stakeholders--focuses on external groups that influence or maintain 
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an interest in the targeted firm’s activities.  Stakeholders include environmental or community 
groups that may object to the nature of the firm’s business.  Stakeholders also include regulatory 
agencies, such as OSHA, that enforce certain laws related to the firm’s activity.
 
Figure 3.1: Juravich’s model for strategic research.59
 Union researchers need to collect adequate information on a firm in an organized fashion 
before undertaking a campaign.  Researchers often emphasize information-gathering in certain 
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areas depending on the specific firm at hand.  For example, a campaign against a private equity 
firm requires a greater emphasis on the command & control and outside stakeholders--
specifically the regulatory box--than the operational components.  Conversely, a union needs to 
heavily research the operational attributes of a retailer, such as Walmart, to understand supply 
and consumer chains.  The form’s specific industry largely dictates the focal pressure points of 
the campaign, but researchers should analyze every component of a company to fully understand 
a its structure and operations.  For example, even though a private equity firm may not appear to 
maintain any connections with a local community, researchers need to understand any potential 
relationship between the firm and key community actors.  The fact that a private equity firm--
despite making millions of dollars--has no connections with the communities in which it invests 
in exposes the completely selfish nature of the firm.  The union could then potentially organize 
community resistance that further escalates the corporate campaign.  
 After uncovering information about the control, operational, and stakeholder connections 
of a firm, researchers transform the analysis into a coordinated campaign.  Juravich argues that 
researchers should conceptualize the vast amount of original findings in a way that exploits the 
firm’s weaknesses.  He identifies four key groupings--Profit Center, Growth Plan, Decision-
Makers, and Key Relationships--that researchers need to understand using the information 
already uncovered.  These groupings help identify a firm’s pressure points and integrate all of the 
prior research into a more coordinated game-plan.  A profit center indicates a firm’s most 
valuable geographic location or particular product.  For example, imagine a union trying to 
organize a specific distribution center of a large retailer.  If research indicates that the targeted 
distribution center does not represent an extremely valuable profit center for the firm, the union 
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may decide to organize a campaign against a more profitable section of the company to pressure 
decision-makers into accepting unionization at the original target site.60  A growth plan often 
proves even more significant than a profit center because the former indicates the financial 
direction of the company.  For example, if a union targets a publicly-traded investment 
company’s whose 10-K indicates that real estate investments more than tripled in the past three 
years, the union needs to focus on these investments instead of other stagnant assets, even if the 
latter make up a larger portion of the firm’s total portfolio.  
 Key decision-makers obviously maintain control over both profit centers and growth 
plans.  Researchers need to recognize that major decision-makers are not always so obvious to 
locate.  For example, the CEO or Board of the targeted company logically appear as ultimate 
decision-makers, but if the firm is a subsidiary of a parent company, then the officials of the 
targeted company possess minimal amounts of power.  Finally, key relations between the firm 
and other groups often present sources of leverage.  A retailer likely develops relationships with 
specific brands and distributors.61  Regulatory agencies often maintain oversight over firms in 
certain industries.  Unions need to exploit these relationships to pressure the company from 
multiple angles.  
SEIU Approach
 Several unions have developed campaign manuals, though most labor leaders hesitate to 
publish such pamphlets because of legal threats.  The SEIU published a contract campaign 
manual in 1998 that shares many similarities with Juravich’s analysis, but places different levels 
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of emphasis on certain strategies.  The SEIU argues that tactical decisions remain very case-
specific.  There exists no tactic or approach that succeeds in every campaign.  This approach 
further highlights the need for creativity and experimentation within campaigns.  Regardless of 
the campaign, researchers should choose tactics that resonate with the workers involved in the 
organizing or contract dispute.  The SEIU emphasizes the importance of escalation, which they 
define as implementing tactics one step at a time to gradually increase worker confidence against 
management.62  The SEIU clearly recognizes the managerial hostility that employees face and 
the psychological effects that employer threats cause workers, which gradual escalation intends 
to mitigate.  
 The SEIU also emphasizes the importance of workplace activities and job actions to a 
greater extent than Juravich.  While the SEIU understands the need to exert pressure against the 
firm from areas outside of the workplace, without active involvement and solidarity on part of 
the workers--especially if the organizing or contract dispute evolves into a strike or a lockout--
those external pressure points lose relevance.63  The SEIU emphasizes intersecting the staff-
driven aspects of the campaign--strategic research and pressure beyond the workplace--with 
worker-centered approaches that advance grassroots mobilization.
 The SEIU identifies three goals for every tactic--cost the employer money, build 
solidarity among workers or between members and potential allies, and make daily life difficult 
for management.  Like Juravich, the SEIU focuses on pressuring the company in financially 
vulnerable locations, but the union also recognizes the importance of psychological and 
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reputation tactics against management.  For example, a union needs to research and develop a 
strategic campaign far in advance of contract negotiations because pressure tactics often require 
an extensive amount of organization.  In addition, “when management sees that you are 
preparing to apply pressure it becomes less likely that you will have to use those tactics, while 
failure to prepare invites management to test the union’s strength.”64  Employers loathe corporate 
campaigns and want to avoid financial and/or reputation attacks on their firm.  The completion of 
research in advance often forces management to accept worker demands, rather than engaging in 
a costly and public battle against the union.
Successful Corporate Campaigns
 In this section, I will analyze the United Steelworkers (USW) victory at Ravenswood and 
the SEIU’s Justice for Janitors (J for J) victory in Los Angeles to understand the essential role 
strategic research plays in both organizing and contract campaigns.  These case studies deal with 
two completely different situations--a contract campaign in a manufacturing industry and an 
organizing drive in the service sector--which further shows that strategic research and corporate 
campaigns remain valuable components of union strategy in a variety of contexts.  After being 
locked out as a result of failed contract negotiations in 1990, the USW undertook an international 
multifaceted campaign against Ravenswood Aluminum Company (RAC) that eventually resulted 
in a new union contract in 1992.  The national J for J campaign reached Los Angeles in 1988, 
and janitors successfully struck, organized, and signed a union contract in 1990.  The struggle 
continued throughout the 1990s and janitors eventually won another contract after a successful 
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strike in 2000.  Both of these case studies highlight the need for strategic research to unveil key 
decision-makers and the development of more aggressive tactics beyond the workplace to 
organize workers and maintain contracts.
 
United Steelworkers at Ravenswood (1990-1992)
 The United Steelworkers (USW) developed a two-tier campaign against Ravenswood 
Aluminum Company (RAC) in Ravenswood, West Virginia that intersected rank-and-file action 
with a multifaceted corporate campaign.  RAC locked workers out on October 31st, 1990 after 
USW Local 5668 and the company failed to agree on a new contract.  The union maintained 
solidarity in Ravenswood by financing the creation of an Assistance Center, which handled much 
of the $300,000 worth of funds from the International Strike Defense Fund and other donations 
from supportive unions and progressive groups.  The Assistance Center redistributed money to 
locked-out members on a need basis.  For example, some members still received coverage from 
an old healthcare plan from the previous company that owned the plant.  Instead of redistributing 
money to these members, the Assistance Center saved more funds to provide for those 
desperately in need of healthcare, which prevented many members from crossing the line and 
returning to work out of necessity.  In fact, only seventeen of the seventeen-hundred workers 
crossed the picket line more than six months into the lockout.65
 The strength and solidarity present in Ravenswood enabled the USW to develop a 
multifaceted campaign that financially disrupted RAC.  The union developed an end-users 
campaign that influenced RAC customers against buying aluminum from the firm.  Workers and 
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researchers discovered that RAC sold aluminum to Coca-Cola, Budweiser, Chrysler, and Ford.  
The union sent locked-out workers to a unionized brewery in St. Paul, Minnesota, to interact 
with brewery workers and distribute thousands of fliers throughout the twin cities to pressure the 
brewery into terminating its relationship with RAC.66  The union eventually persuaded a number 
of major beverage and auto companies to halt business with RAC, which resulted in more than a 
$200 million revenue loss for the firm between 1989 and 1991.67
 The USW pursued action through state and national regulatory bodies that further 
pressured RAC into terminating the lockout and accepting worker demands.  The union relied on 
state-level environmental agencies, OSHA, and the NLRB to threaten large amounts of 
regulatory fees.  The USW pursued an alliance with environmental groups once the union 
discovered RCA’s poor environmental record, which led to a lawsuit before the state 
government.  Workers informed the union that RAC failed to comply with some OSHA 
regulations, which led union staff to demand an inspection of the site.  The inspection culminated 
in a major fine and heightened public outrage towards RAC.  The USW also pursued a case 
through the NLRB that attempted to classify the work stoppage as an illegal lockout, which 
would provide workers with unemployment compensation and a guaranteed return to work once 
the conflict ended.  This NLRB case threatened to cost RAC more than one-hundred million 
dollars in back pay, which further pressured the company to negotiate an end to the lockout.68
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 The most important and ambitious aspect of the USW’s multifaceted campaign concerned 
RAC’s key decision-makers.  While the union received vital information from workers with 
regard to RAC’s poor environmental and safety record, workers assumed that local CEO Emmett  
Boyle controlled all decision-making power.  Union researchers discovered that Boyle remained 
relatively powerless within RAC’s complex structure, and traced control over the company to 
fugitive international finance trader Marc Rich.  The USW needed to pressure Rich directly to 
achieve victory in Ravenswood.  Rich wanted to evade the public spotlight if he desired to 
maintain his secret financial trades and eventually return to the United States to see his family.69  
The USW sent a delegation of Steelworkers over to Switzerland, where Rich resided, to increase 
the media spotlight on the American fugitive.  The USW also created an “international picket 
line.. around the Rich operation”70 by aligning with trade unionists in Eastern Europe, which 
prevented him from completing lucrative financial deals.  These financial and reputation 
pressures on Rich eventually led to the end of the lockout and a new contract in Ravenswood.
Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles (1988-2000)
 Strategic research and the development of a multifaceted campaign remained crucial 
components of the J for J drive in Los Angeles, which targeted janitorial employers and building 
owners throughout the city and operated outside of the NLRB election process.  The SEIU 
allocated multiple researchers to the campaign, including one full-time researcher based in L.A. 
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that functioned “exclusively as an information-gatherer and utilizer.’’71  Strategic research pulled 
the levers to discover and pressure ultimate decision-makers.  As one organizer stated, the SEIU 
constructed “a war against the employers and the business owners, waged on all fronts [without] 
leaving any stone unturned.”72  Because the building owners subcontracted the janitorial 
employer duties, the union needed to campaign against owners as the major decision-makers.  
Both Ravenswood and J for J show that direct employers--especially in a globalized economy--
often obscure the actual decision-makers behind the firm.  Many organizing drives target 
contractors or other subsidiaries that remain subordinate to larger, but more invisible, corporate 
actors.  Complexities in corporate structure brought about by neoliberalism and its emphasis on 
labor flexibility impels unions to engage in strategic research to identify key decision-makers 
and effectively pressure the firm beyond the workplace.
 The SEIU pressured janitorial employers and business owners through a variety of 
mechanisms that intended to increase financial costs and affect the firms’ growth plans.  Despite 
working outside of the NLRB process, the union pursued many legal tactics that pressured the 
employers in a variety of ways.  SEIU Local 399 filed unfair labor practice claims with the 
NLRB and health and safety violations through other governmental agencies.  These legal 
pressures increased employer costs and threatened additional fines if the cases were decided in 
the workers’ favor.73  The SEIU also took advantage of local community allies to directly affect 
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employers’ major growth plans.  During the campaign, a massive building boom occurred 
throughout downtown L.A., but construction required the approval of the Community 
Redevelopment Authority (CRA).  The SEIU had several allies--including the head of the L.A. 
Country Federation of Labor--on CRA’s board.  Because of this leverage, “the SEIU was able to 
ensure that no downtown office tower built after 1987 opened up without a unionized cleaning 
crew.”74  The SEIU forced building owners to contract out to unionized janitorial companies to 
expand downtown.
 The SEIU also developed tactics that damaged the target employers’ reputation and led to 
increased political and community awareness to the plight of exploited janitors.  These tactics 
necessitated active involvement of rank-and-file workers, which served to intersect the top-down 
and bottom-up approaches utilized by the union.  Researchers identified key decision-makers 
within the targeted firms and devised strategies to publicly embarrass these individuals.  For 
example, organizers and janitors constantly traveled to and performed street theater at elite 
country clubs and upscale restaurants where employers dined.75  The most public and 
transformational aspect of the campaign involved demonstrations at Century City--the workplace 
of many striking janitors.  The police violently repressed peaceful protests at Century City, which 
helped the public image of striking janitors.  The SEIU utilized political alliances to persuade 
Mayor Tom Bradley into pressuring employers at Century City to accept union contracts, which 
Bradley did after witnessing the brutal treatment of protestors during the demonstrations.76  
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Reputation attacks proved just as vital as financial threats to forcing employers to accept 
neutrality and recognize unionization.
 The SEIU continued strategic research after the victory in 1990, which enabled the union 
to respond swiftly and creatively to employer attempts to de-unionize the janitors.  The J for J 
campaign did not end in 1990 with the birth of the first contract.  L.A. janitors struck in 2000 for 
a better contract and the SEIU supported the strike with the same intensive research tactics used 
in 1990.  Researchers knew that Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and pension funds owned 
choice properties in L.A. and throughout the nation.  SEIU leaders decided to target real estate 
owners in multiple cities to escalate pressure.  For example, “if the local on strike in L.A. against 
ABM 77, say, sent one picket to a building cleaned by ABM in New York, the New York janitors 
wouldn’t clean the building.”78  SEIU targeted owners because they held ultimate decision-
making power over the subcontractors involved in the union contract negotiations.  The wages of 
low-salaried janitors in L.A. meant less to REITs than the subcontractors, which explains why 
the SEIU wanted to pressure subcontractors through national companies.  As SEIU President 
Andy Stern stated, “large numbers of the owners were much more interested in settling--and 
settling quickly--than the contractors.”79  
 The SEIU had an even easier time with buildings owned by pension plans.  At the time, 
the two largest pension funds in the United States were CalPERS and CalSTRS, which held the 
pensions of California public employees and teachers.  The SEIU represented more public 
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employees than any other union in California during this time period.  The union used its power 
to force contractors in pension plan-owned buildings to accept janitor demands.80  Strategic 
research and the appliance of pressure beyond the workplace helped end the 2000 strike in three 
weeks, as employers accepted union demands that gave janitors a twenty-six percent pay raise.81  
Failed Campaigns
 In this section, I will analyze the Allied Industrial Workers (AIW) Local 837-United 
Paperworkers’ International Union (UPIU) Local 7837 defeat at the A.E. Staley Company and 
the Communication Workers of America (CWA) failure to organize Los Angeles port truckers.  
Like the last section, these two campaigns highlight a contract struggle in a manufacturing sector 
and an organizing effort in the service sector.  At Staley, union members developed problems 
with the company soon after the multinational agribusiness Tate & Lyle acquired a 90% stake in 
the company in 1988.  Workers developed an in-plant campaign before being locked-out, which 
forced the union to adopt an array of tactics to pressure Staley from multiple angles.  In Los 
Angeles, immigrant port truckers--classified mostly as independent contractors-- attempted to 
form a union in the mid-1990s with help from the CWA.  The CWA had no prior experience in 
the trucking industry and faced the daunting task of organizing contractors, who are technically 
not able to form a union under American labor law.  The CWA developed several creative tactics, 
but failed to gain a comprehensive understanding of the trucking industry, which doomed the 
organizing drive.
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AIW Local 873-UPIU Local 7837 at A.E. Staley (1992-1995)
 Like many unionized manufacturing firms in the late-twentieth century, Staley pursued an 
aggressive strategy to de-unionize its facility in Decatur, Illinois.  Once negotiations broke down 
near the expiration of the existing contract in 1992, Local 837 in workers relied on a work-to-
rule strategy to pressure the company into offering a better deal.  For nine months leading up to 
the lockout on June 27, 1993, workers at Staley slowed production, strictly adhered to every sort 
of regulation governing the labor process, and refused to communicate with supervisors.  By the 
time of the lockout, workers had successfully cut production in half.82  Even though the work-to-
rule strategy failed to create a fair contract, Local 837 members greatly supported the tactic 
because it empowered each individual on the assembly line and adhered to the grassroots 
unionism that the local desired.  
 After the lockout began, Local 837 pursued a mix of bottom-up and top-down strategies 
to combat Staley.  The union relied on militant rank-and-file members--dubbed “road warriors”--
to travel throughout the country and raise funds.  Between late-1992 and 1995, “the local raised 
over $3.5 million from unions and sympathetic individuals, much of it through the Road 
Warriors.”83  Local 837 relied on rank-and-file workers more so than any other union in U.S. 
history to travel the country and create solidarity groups, which helped generate significant 
financial support.  Union staffers developed several corporate campaigns to pressure Staley.  
Local 837 sought the help of Ray Rogers, who devised the first widely recognized corporate 
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campaign at J.P. Stevens in the late-1970s and frequently consulted with unions in the 1980s and 
1990s.  Rogers identified State Farm as the primary corporate campaign target, with Domino 
Sugar and Miller Brewing Company as secondary targets.  After success at Miller, the union also 
decided to take on Pepsi, which purchased thirty percent of Staley’s overall sale of high-fructose 
corn syrup.84  
 The corporate campaigns developed unevenly, lacked sufficient organizational direction, 
and sometimes alienated the local membership.  Members originally embraced Rogers’ choice of 
targeting State Farm, but quickly questioned the relevance of the insurance company to Staley.  
Rogers discovered that State Farm was the largest stockholder and bondholder of Archer Daniels 
Midland (ADM), a Decatur-based multibillion agribusiness multinational.  Despite an 
appearance as competitors, ADM represented Tate & Lyle’s biggest stockholder, with 7.4% of 
shares.85  Furthermore, State Farm held a significant amount of bonds and stock in Caterpillar, 
whose union members were also involved in a labor dispute.86  The State Farm connection 
allowed Local 837 and the UAW to combine forces.  
 While Rogers effectively untangled the complex corporate relationships and key 
decision-makers behind Staley, he overstated the importance of State Farm.  Rogers refused to 
focus resources on the Domino Sugar and Miller campaigns because of his stubbornness on State 
Farm and his belief in the importance of key financial decision-makers.  Financial decision-
makers represent a great source of leverage, but State Farm controlled only 7.2% of stock in a 
corporation that owned 7.4% of Tate & Lyle.  The connection was not prominent enough to 
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warrant solely focusing on State Farm instead of pursuing a multifaceted campaign that targeted 
several key firms.  Furthermore, locked-out workers began to question the State Farm campaign, 
which produced no immediate results.  The rank-and-file could not understand the complex 
connection between Staley and State Farm, and wanted to focus resources on other boycott 
strategies that made more sense.87  
 After the failed State Farm endeavor, the union transferred resources to a Miller 
campaign that proved successful.  Several staff members argued that the union should focus on 
direct customers of Staley to hurt the company financially.  Miller, which accounted for 11% of 
Staley’s income,88 also resonated well with union members.  Miller succumbed to pressure from 
an end-users campaign by locked-out Ravenswood workers just a couple years earlier, which 
provided the union with precedent for the campaign.  Road warriors mobilized solidarity groups 
in Chicago and Wisconsin to publicly protest against Miller.  The union successfully pressured 
Miller at distribution centers in several major cities and received support from the Teamsters, as 
truck drivers were responsible for transporting Miller’s goods.  After eight months, Miller 
terminated its relationship with Staley.89
 Local 837, which by this point had become Local 7837 of UPIU, escalated pressure 
against Staley by developing a campaign against PepsiCo, another large customer.  Union 
members and officials were convinced that, if adequate pressure forced PepsiCo to terminate its 
contract at the end of the year with Staley, the locked-out workers would return to their jobs 
under a fairer contract.  The union targeted three major PepsiCo subsidiaries--Kentucky Fried 
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Chicken, Taco Bell, and Pizza Hut--and had solidarity committees and student groups leaflet 
local franchises in seventy American cities.90  
 While Local 7837 continued to escalate pressure against Pepsi, international leaders 
decided to cut losses and regain control over the campaign.  Local 7837 planned an escalated 
militant tactic to rally and engage in civil disobedience at Pepsi headquarters in Purchase, New 
York.  Just prior to the event, leaders at UPIU refused to support the action and cut off all support 
from both the international and the AFL-CIO.91  Many union defeats of the time period--such as 
those involving Hormel employees and Maine paper workers--resulted largely from a severe 
disconnect between the international and local unions.  International staffers often want to reign 
in control over local members once a struggle becomes too radicalized or costly.  UPIU leaders 
supposedly feared a lawsuit resulting from the protest action at Pepsi and used this reasoning to 
scale back the campaign.  The union conceded defeat, and locked-out workers could not proceed 
without top-down support.  
 The failure to force management to agree on a new contract for the locked-out workers 
resulted from a variety of factors, including union strategy.  Many labor leaders and academics at 
the time argued that, despite the defeat, the Staley conflict injected new life into the American 
labor movement.  CWA vice president Jane Pierce stated that the Staley struggle became “a rank-
and-file fight that really... did have the potential of revitalizing the union movement.”92  Potential 
is the key word in this quote, and while the Staley battle did involve a large amount of bottom-up 
empowerment, some activists believed that the rank-and-file lost power as the struggle 
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progressed.  Rank-and-file leader Art Dhermy argued that “I think we fell off after we got locked 
out.  The only things that really involved a majority of our people were a few of the rallies.  We 
needed... to keep the membership mobilized... it took us too long to refocus on the next step that 
we had to take.”93  The road warriors and solidarity committees developed through direct rank-
and-file action, but some union members believed that most locked-out workers--who lacked the 
activism of a few politicized members--felt disempowered once the lockout began.
 The major problems with union strategy during the lockout concerned the relative 
ineffectiveness of the corporate campaigns.  Once the lockout began, the union heavily relied on 
Rogers, who had significant experience in developing corporate campaigns on both the winning 
and losing sides.94  Rogers emphasized the importance of pressuring State Farm, but did so at the 
expense of developing a more multifaceted campaign to pressure Staley from multiple angles.  
The union eventually pursued other targets--successfully against Miller and unsuccessfully 
against Pepsi--but these campaigns followed one another instead of occurring simultaneously.  
Campaign strategy should have centered more directly on how to influence the multinational 
agribusiness--beyond the State Farm campaign--instead of only focusing on Staley’s customer 
relationships.
 The union would have benefitted from a separate team of researchers that solely focused 
on corporate campaigning.  While unions did not devote as much resources to research and 
campaigning as they do now--although many organizations still lack these essential staff 
members--a group of union researchers would have been more accountable to the membership 
and more prepared to wage a war against Staley.  The research team could have developed an 
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understanding of Staley’s key decision-makers and customers before the failed contract 
negotiations even began, thereby enabling the creation of a multifaceted campaign to pressure 
Tate & Lyle from multiple targets at once, instead of proceeding slowly.  The solidarity 
committees raised a tremendous amount of money for locked out workers between 1992 and 
1995, which could have funded more multifaceted campaign tactics.  
CWA and Port Truckers (1996)
 A largely Latino port truckers force in mid-1990s Los Angeles faced several obstacles to 
unionization unique to neoliberalism.  The Teamsters had successfully organized a large portion 
of the trucking industry prior to the 1980s, but deregulation has reduced union presence in the 
field.  A large obstacle to reclaiming union power--and the greatest challenge in the case study at 
hand--concerned the relabeling of truckers as independent contractors.95  Most truckers were 
technically self-employed and hired by the more than two-hundred trucking firms at the port.  
The expansive rise of contracting as a form of employment to enhance employer flexibility 
significantly weakens the prospects of unionization.  
 Despite these obstacles, thousands of Latino truckers at the port of Los Angeles-Long 
Beach organized a campaign for union recognition in the mid-1990s.  The impetus for organizing 
came from the bottom-up, and the truckers sought the help of a union for strategic assistance on 
how to overcome the independent contractor obstacle to collective action.  Being bypassed by 
the Teamsters and other unions, the L.A. port truckers contacted the CWA, a progressive service 
sector union with no experience in the trucking industry.  While the CWA approached the 
campaign very enthusiastically and developed several innovative tactics, the union failed to 
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develop an effective top-down campaign to successfully advance the self-organized port 
truckers’ struggle.96
 The L.A. port truckers campaign differed from traditional organizing drives because the 
CWA was not forced to convince workers of the benefits of unionization.  The truckers came to 
CWA Local 9400--which primarily represented telephone workers--as a disciplined and self-
organized group.  As a CWA official stated, “We didn’t have to organize them, they already were 
organized.”97  The truckers’ solidarity enabled the union to solely focus on strategies to 
overcome the independent contractor obstacle and pressure employers.  Local 9400 began by 
pursuing the NLRB route to resolve issues pertaining to the independent contractor status.  
However, the NLRB approach went nowhere and the union had to devise more innovative 
strategies to reclassify contractors as employees.
 After the port truckers decided to go on strike in 1996, the CWA developed an approach 
to organize both traditional employees and independent contractors.  The union first attempted to 
organize the dozen or so port trucking companies that employed workers instead of contracting 
out to independent truckers.  The more ambitious and innovative plan to organize the large 
majority of truckers who operated as independent contractors involved the creation of a separate 
trucking firm to employ unionized labor.  The CWA communicated with former insurance agent 
Donald Allen, who “proposed establishing a new firm, the Transport Maritime Association 
(TMA), which would hire the truckers as conventional employees and then recognize CWA 
Local 9400 as their union.”98  The ingenious fairy-tale like plan overcame the independent 
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contractor issue and employer resistance.  Allen and Local 9300 convinced nearly five thousand 
contractors to sell their trucks and work for TMA.  However, the trucking companies--backed by 
the immense financial power of shipping firms--successfully prevailed against the work stoppage 
that ensued when contractors joined TMA.  The CWA also overestimated Allen’s ability to 
finance such a large scale operation, and the TMA experiment dissolved and forced truckers to 
return to contracting as the organizing effort was defeated.99
 The CWA suffered from a limited understanding of the trucking industry and a lack of 
strategic research during the organizing campaign.  The union had virtually no experience in 
trucking and did not understand the industry’s structure and complexities.  While the CWA 
allocated resources towards strategic tactics for the organizing drive, the union did not possess 
the research capabilities of the SEIU, and failed to develop an adequate understanding of the 
industry prior to the 1996 strike.  The union underestimated the extent of opposition from both 
trucking and shipping firms during the campaign.  Furthermore, CWA officials did not complete 
a thorough background check of Allen’s financial situation.  This failure proved most fatal of all, 
as the innovative scheme faltered under financial difficulties that the CWA should have 
foreseen.100  
 The CWA’s unsuccessful drive to organize a very solidaristic group of immigrant port 
truckers questions whether unions can succeed in unchartered territories.  While the Teamsters 
were best positioned to develop a successful organizing drive, the specific union involved does 
not inherently dictate the outcome of a campaign.  The CWA needed to complete more research 
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and gather background information to adequately understand the trucking industry nearly as well 
as the Teamsters.101  The development of such an understanding would have entailed greater 
costs, but remained feasible.  The CWA could have also developed other pressure tactics against 
trucking employers and the shipping associations that financed them.  Instead of devoting 
resources into a failed NLRB or placing the fate of the entire campaign into a single idea, the 
union could have pursued a multifaceted strategy to pressure key decision-makers from various 
angles.  A comprehensive strategy could have supported the development of both the NLRB 
legal cases and Allen’s plan by forcing the trucking companies to mount defenses on multiple 
fronts.  For example, government agencies heavily regulate shipping centers and transportation, 
and L.A. regulatory bodies likely contained at least some pro-labor officials or offered some sort 
of leverage to exploit against trucking firms.  While such speculation is much easier said than 
done, and the CWA likely researched multiple possible strategies, the union placed too many 
resources into a single tactic.
Conclusion: Importance of Strategic Research and Corporate Campaigns
 Both the theoretical approaches to strategic research and the case studies of successful 
and unsuccessful union campaigns show that unions need to undertake strategic research to 
develop successful organizing drives and win contract negotiations.  Research is an essential 
prerequisite for any campaign because unions need to unveil the key decision-makers hidden 
behind complex corporate structures.  Traditional union strategies that emphasize organizing 
workers against a visible employer no longer remain adequate in an era of neoliberal capitalism.  
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101 Ideally, the Teamsters or some other progressive organization knowledgable of the port trucking 
industry could have aided the CWA, but such union collaboration seems very rare.
Employers have adopted sophisticated and hostile antiunion mechanisms and unions no longer 
maintain effective recourse through the NLRB.  Unions need to develop leverage-based tactics 
that identify hidden decision-makers and pressure firms beyond the workplace.
 The case studies presented in this section further highlight the importance of strategic 
research and corporate campaigns.  Both the USW victory at Ravenswood and the SEIU success 
in L.A. relied on strategic research to unveil absolute decision-makers.  The USW and SEIU then 
successfully campaigned against these previously obscured decision-makers through effective 
tactics that utilized rank-and-file members and key external relationships.  The failed Staley and 
port trucker campaigns also involved large amounts of research and corporate campaigns, but the 
research proved inadequate and the campaigns proceeded unevenly.  At Staley, the AIW-UPIU at 
first relied too heavily on the State Farm campaign and then narrowed their targets to Staley 
customers, instead of an array of influential decision-makers.  In the port truckers’ case, the 
CWA never developed an adequate understanding of the trucking industry and placed too many 
resources into the TMA experiment.  Both of these campaigns lacked a multifaceted strategy to 
pressure key decision-makers from multiple angles.  Effective campaigns force employers to 
defend on multiple fronts at once, as proven by both Ravenswood and J for J.  The next chapter 
focuses on two contemporary organizing drives that further illuminate the significance of 
strategic research and corporate campaigns.  
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Chapter Four: Case Studies of Contemporary Organizing Strategy
Methodology Note
 The research developed in this chapter resulted from an internship, several interviews, 
and various news sources that have covered these campaigns.  In its original form, this chapter 
focuses on two case studies of contemporary organizing drives that utilized strategic research and 
corporate campaigns.  For my first case study, I interned with a union during January 2014 in 
New York City and helped complete research in support of an ongoing organizing drive.  At the 
union’s request, I am unable to disclose research about my first case study beyond the eyes of my 
Honors’ advisors.  This case study supports several of the findings I derive from my other case 
study and research already presented in this paper.  
 My second case study is the much publicized UAW defeat at the Volkswagen (VW) plant 
down in Chattanooga, Tennessee.  The UAW attempted to make history by organizing a foreign 
owned automobile plant in the viscously anti-union South.  Despite winning a neutrality 
agreement from VW, the UAW narrowly lost the NLRB election held between February 19-21, 
2014.  For the UAW case, I rely mostly on extensive periodical coverage and two discussions 
with a UAW researcher.  The researcher did not work extensively on the campaign, but was in 
Chattanooga completing analysis for the two weeks leading up to the NLRB election.  He 
provided me with some behind-the-scenes analysis that received little attention in the press.  
Introduction
 These case studies support the argument that strategic research and corporate campaigns 
are necessary components of union strategy to combat neoliberal capital.  Traditional organizing 
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tactics at the workplace no longer effectively pressure management.  Strategic research is a 
prerequisite to figure out how to successfully organize workers by unveiling key decision-makers 
and pressuring employers from sources beyond the shop floor.  Unions need to direct strategic 
research towards developing multifaceted campaigns that pressure key decision-makers from a 
variety of angles.  These campaigns generally require a large amount of creative 
experimentation.  Even if the campaign succeeds, unions rarely know exactly which tactic forced 
the company to the bargaining table.  While these campaigns present numerous difficulties, not 
all are extremely costly, and most remain necessary to achieve victory.  
UAW-VW in Chattanooga
Background
 Neoliberalism has also extended to the manufacturing sector, as employers favor 
flexibility over the employment rigidities common under the Fordist era.  Southern states 
continue to attract foreign investment by promising low corporate taxes and a nonunion 
workforce.  Foreign-owned firms develop the flexible labor markets that they desire.  For 
example, many--possibly a majority-- employees at the Nissan plant in Smyrna, Tennessee are 
independent contractors employed by staffing agencies that do not work directly for Nissan.  The 
contractor label allows Nissan to bypass benefits given to traditional employees--such as 
retirement benefits and long term disability.102   Many workers--and even some conservative 
politicians--dislike Nissan’s contracting policy and the poor conditions it creates for employees.  
However, many of these same workers vigorously oppose unionization, largely because they 
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believe that unions cause capital flight.103  Nissan--like VW in Chattanooga--provides numerous 
jobs and has enabled the city to grow.  A mediocre job is better than no job, and the nonunion 
appeal of many Southern states attracts foreign investment and job growth in areas that would 
otherwise suffer from chronic unemployment.  Southern workers desire improvement, but many 
share the belief that unions drive capital away.  To organize in the South, the UAW needs to 
adapt to this hostile structural and ideological terrain.
 The UAW implemented strategic research and corporate campaigns to develop and 
support the VW organizing drive.  Suffering drastic declines in union density, UAW leaders 
determined that they need to organize Southern transnationals or face inevitable disaster.  The 
UAW focused attention on the VW plant because the union researched sources of leverage that 
enabled neutrality.  However, the UAW’s organizing drive in Chattanooga became a highly 
publicized event and resulted in defeat for the union in a NLRB election held between February 
19th-21st, 2014.  Unions and scholars often criticize NLRB elections for failing to prevent 
managerial intimidation at the polling booth.  In this case, politicized conservative groups 
substituted for a hostile management to persuade workers to vote against the union, and the 
UAW failed to prevent or respond to this intimidation.  
Union Strategy I: Strategic Research and the Corporate Campaign
 The UAW needs to focus on organizing foreign-owned automobile companies, part 
suppliers, or non-automobile workers.  The UAW has suffered dramatic density loss over the past 
three decades, declining from 1.5 million members in 1979 to under 400,000 today.  UAW 
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President Bob King has focused his presidency on developing corporate research to determine 
the direction of union strategy.  King actually led numerous drives in the 1990s and early-2000s 
to organize casino workers, graduate students, public sector employees, and other non-
automobile members.104  The UAW has also shifted some resources towards organizing part 
suppliers, but many obstacles exist.  Part suppliers no longer operate in big centralized plants.  
Unions face obvious additional challenges organizing small supplier shops in a piecemeal 
fashion where small gains are difficult to achieve.  Furthermore, the foreign transplants oppose 
supplier unionization, which adds yet another barrier to organizing decentralized parts shops.105  
 Strategic research revealed the importance of organizing foreign-owned automobile 
companies in the South to maintain union power.  King came into his presidency pledging to 
organize at least one foreign-owned automobile manufacturer in the South.  While he stated in 
March 2013 that the UAW needs to continue to diversify--especially in untraditional areas--the 
union has undoubtedly devoted a tremendous amount of resources to organizing Southern 
transnationals.  The UAW has developed major organizing drives at the VW plant in 
Chattanooga, Tennessee, a Nissan plant in Canton, Mississippi, and a Mercedes plant in Vance, 
Alabama.
 The UAW escalated the organizing campaign at VW because research indicated an 
enhanced likelihood of success compared to other transnationals.  Unlike other German 
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automobile firms--such as Mercedes and BMW--workers control sixty percent of VW.106 
Researchers also understood that VW operates a German-style works council at its plants 
throughout the globe.  VW has shown interest in developing a works council in Chattanooga, 
which would enable workers to maintain a greater voice on issues--such as productivity and 
safety measures--generally delegated solely to management.  VW officials and labor experts 
interpreted that American labor law requires a union to represent workers at a firm that wants to 
implement a works councils, as an independent works council is equated with an illegal company  
union.107  
 The UAW developed a corporate campaign to pressure VW-Chattanooga by allying with 
the prominent German union IG Metall, which represents VW workers in Germany.  IG Metall 
chairman Berthold Huber also serves as deputy chairman on VW’s German supervisory board.108  
The UAW took advantage of IG Metall’s influence over VW through German co-determination 
laws and successfully leveraged American managers at the plant in Chattanooga to accept 
neutrality.  Like most American managers, supervisors at the Chattanooga plant have no desire to 
accept unionization.  The UAW bypassed these managers by forming alliances with those that 
hold ultimate decision-making power over VW’s actions in Chattanooga.
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 The UAW successfully used relations with IG Metall and VW’s history of promoting 
works councils to bring about a neutrality agreement, but the union failed to capture card check 
provisions.  After achieving neutrality with VW, the role of corporate campaigns appears limited 
because of the favorable relations developed between the UAW and VW.  Despite a seemingly 
positive relationship between the UAW and VW, the firm was not as aggressively pro-union as 
many center-right commentators claimed.  VW had a chance to recognize the UAW in September 
2013 through card check procedures.  The union claimed to have a majority of signatures within 
the 1,600 employee plant, but VW desired a secret ballot election to determine unionization.  
Eaton and Kriesky’s research on neutrality and card check organizing shows that neutrality 
agreements with card check provisions greatly enhances union win rates, but neutrality 
agreements without card check does not significantly change election outcome.  The UAW could 
have escalated pressure tactics on the company to accept card check, but decided against 
mounting such a campaign.
Union Strategy II: Conservative Opposition and Failure to Respond
 Politicized conservative groups substituted for the lack of a hostile management to wage 
a vicious anti-union campaign in the two weeks leading up to the NLRB election.  UAW officials 
remained very confident that they would win a certification election, and devised a twenty-page 
agreement with VW on January 27, 2014, that outlined an agreement on union and management 
actions leading up to the February 12-14th election.109  The UAW underestimated the extent of 
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conservative political influence that occurred just prior to the election in February.110  For 
example, the Grover Norquist-led Americans for Tax Reform organization constructed billboards 
throughout Chattanooga linking the UAW to topics as varied as the downfall of Detroit, 
President Barack Obama, and abortion rights.111  Both Senator Bob Corker and Tennessee 
Governor Bill Haslam made constant public appearances impelling workers to vote against the 
UAW.  The biggest threat came from Tennessee State Senator Bo Watson, who remarked that a 
UAW victory would likely prevent the state legislature from approving future subsidies to VW.  
Numerous Republicans built on fears of capital flight by arguing that the loss of state subsidies 
would lead VW to begin new operations in Mexico, thereby costing Tennessee jobs.112
 Despite signing a neutrality agreement, union supporters inside the plant argued that low-
level supervisors and salaried employees ineligible for unionization actively opposed the 
organizing drive in February.  Pro-UAW worker Wayne Cliett stated that “The salaried people 
from Pilot Hall [the prestigious research and development center at the plant] stood out front 
every day this past week with [anti-UAW] shirts on, and I truly believe they swayed the votes 
their way.”113  The neutrality agreement forbade VW management from intimidating workers, 
but low-level supervisors appeared to ignore these directives.  The UAW failed to publicly 
confront VW about apparent intimidation tactics.  Furthermore, the neutrality agreement 
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constrained the union in several ways.114  The UAW agreed not to utilize aggressive strategies 
against VW during the lead-up to the election.
 The coordinated and swift actions of well-funded conservative actors and the relatively 
obscured intimidation tactics by low-level supervisors and salaried employees--combined with 
the UAW’s failure to effectively respond--played a large role in the union’s narrow defeat in the 
NLRB election.  In a phone interview, a UAW researcher stated that the union underestimated 
the extent and importance of direct conservative political influence in the days leading up to the 
election.  In hindsight, the researcher stated that the UAW could have tried to pressure VW to 
respond more aggressively to this political influence, but the union lacked the time or 
coordination to do so.115  He also argued that the public nature of the campaign did not affect the 
UAW’s strategy.  The union focused its efforts directly on the workers inside the plant and 
believed that external influences only develop a limited extent of influence.116  In such a narrow 
defeat for the UAW, one can only assume that external political influences played a large role in 
the election’s outcome.
Implications
 The UAW needed a near-perfect organizing strategy to win an NLRB election in the 
South.  Critics of the UAW’s strategy in Chattanooga need to recognize “the political and 
economic vortex of neoliberalism, financialization, and globalization, [which means] there’s no 
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stopping creative destruction in the auto industry.”117  The UAW also had to overcome fears that 
unionization leads to capital flight.  The fact that VW received 83,000 applicants for 2,500 jobs 
upon opening in 2011 shows how much Tennessee workers value employment opportunities.118  
While the UAW assuaged some fears related to capital flight through VW’s neutrality, the 
union’s strategy remained flawed in three interconnected ways.  First, the UAW failed to 
pressure VW into accepting card check procedures as part of the neutrality agreement.  Second, 
the UAW appeared to halt strategic research after the neutrality agreement and was unprepared to 
deal with external actors during the election process.  Third, the UAW agreed to curtail 
aggressive campaign strategies to promote a cooperative environment with VW.  
 The union’s failure to organize through card check and eventual reliance on an NLRB 
certification election obviously hurt the chances of unionization.  The problems associated with 
NLRB elections are well-documented and received attention in chapters one and two of this 
paper.  In this case, political influence replaced employer intimidation as a major determinant of 
election outcome.  The UAW allegedly collected a majority of signatures for card check 
recognition in September 2013, but failed to pressure VW into accepting union recognition at the 
time.  The UAW researcher stated that an election represents more of a unifying process, which 
explains why the union did not aggressively seek card check recognition.119  This argument 
appears weak, and likely something occurred behind-the-scenes that explains why the union 
bypassed card check procedures.  
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 The UAW failed to escalate strategic research and develop potential campaign tactics to 
foster a more balanced election environment.  While conceding that the union remained 
unprepared for such a rapid vicious assault from conservative actors that undoubtedly influenced 
the campaign, the UAW researcher held firm to the belief that “what matters most is what 
happens inside the plant.”120  The UAW constantly focused on persuading a group of undecided 
workers to vote in favor of unionization, as these workers would decide the inevitably close 
election.  However, in the twenty-first century, organizing drives are no longer entirely about the 
workers inside the plant.  The UAW proved this point by developing an alliance with a powerful 
German union to lay the foundation for unionization in Chattanooga.  This process involved 
limited activity by workers inside the plant.  Of course, the workers themselves still matter and 
determine the elections, but external factors--whether it consist of employer-sponsored 
intimidation or conservative political influence--directly affect ideology and election results.  
Top-down and bottom-up processes need to intersect throughout the entire organizing drive and 
continue after the election to solidify unionism in the twenty-first century.  The UAW lacked 
continuous strategic research and failed to implement aggressive top-down tactics to combat 
hostile antiunion forces in the two weeks leading up to the election.
 Many alternative media outlets have criticized the UAW for failing to develop a more 
aggressive and grassroots organizing struggle.  UAW President King has advocated a more 
moderate and cooperative approach to organizing transnationals.  The VW campaign shows that 
the UAW believes that developing relationships with corporate decision-makers and achieving 
neutrality remain essential prerequisites of successful organizing.  The union’s approach contains 
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many top-down components, as leaders and organizers relied on relationships with key allies and 
corporate actors to lay the foundation for unionization.  However, a reliance on top-down 
approaches in the campaign does not indicate that the UAW has completely abandoned militancy. 
Rank-and-file aggression simply did not exist in this situation.  The conservatism of the South--
especially white male southerners, who represent a large component of VW-Chattanooga's work 
force--prevents the UAW from adhering to the same worker-centered philosophy advocated by 
many grassroots activists to organize in such a hostile context.  The UAW needed to play an 
active role by laying the foundation for unionism through top-down approaches while 
encouraging class-consciousness within the plant.  The UAW’s failure resulted not from the 
union’s inability to foster militancy, but rather from scaling back more aggressive top-down 
campaign tactics.  UAW leaders placed too much hope in VW’s neutrality.  Hindsight is twenty-
twenty, but the union could have escalated pressure on VW to accept card check, prevented 
intimidation from low-level supervisors, and more forcefully combated external political 
influences.
Conclusion: Important Lessons
 The UAW’s failed organizing drive at VW-Chattanooga reinforces many contemporary 
trends in American trade unionism.  First, the UAW case study further exposes the weaknesses 
inherent to the NLRB election process.  Political intimidation was prevalent in the weeks leading 
up to the election, which likely played a role in the outcome.  Intimidation within NLRB 
elections emphasizes the importance of card check as an organizing tool.  The UAW had an 
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opportunity to push for card check recognition, but failed to pressure VW to bypass the 
institutionalized election system.  
 Second, this case study also highlights that neutrality agreements produce a dilemma for 
unions.  Many unions emphasize the importance of obtaining employer neutrality through such 
agreements.  However, studies mentioned earlier in this paper show that neutrality agreements 
without card check provisions do not substantially alter union win rates.  Furthermore, neutrality 
agreements generally limit union strategy by regulating the use of aggressive tactics.  While the 
neutrality agreement with VW restricted the use of corporate campaign tactics, the UAW should 
have continued developing strategic research to prepare for the relentless political campaign that 
infiltrated Chattanooga in the weeks leading up to the election.  Neutrality agreements remain an 
essential component to union strategy, but these agreements do not come without costs.
Conclusion: The Necessity of Creative and Innovative Campaigns
 The organizing drive in Chattanooga underscores the importance of strategic research in 
contemporary organizing campaigns.  UAW researchers unveiled key decision-makers and 
developed a campaign to form an alliance with the powerful IG Metall to exert pressure on 
important VW leaders.  Targeted analysis enabled researchers to determine which companies to 
campaign against.  While deficiencies--such as the failure to organize through card check--in 
union strategy may account for part of UAW’s defeat, corporate campaigns do not represent a 
magic bullet for the labor movement.  The UAW needed to develop a political campaign to 
combat the aggressive conservative operation in Chattanooga just prior to and through the NLRB 
election.  Nevertheless, this campaign proves the necessity of strategic research to understand 
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complex industries and unveil concealed decision-makers.  Strategic research uncovers the need 
for creative corporate campaigns that pressure firms beyond the site of the workplace.
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Conclusion: Obstacles to and Opportunities for a New Type of Unionism
Overview
 In this paper, I have attempted to show that strategic research and corporate campaigns 
are essential components of an effective union strategy.  I have argued that research and strategic 
campaigns are important for three major reasons.  First, strategic research reveals decision-
makers-makers who often remain obscured through complex corporate structures.  Key decision-
makers frequently operate far away from the workplace and workers themselves sometimes do 
not know who the central decision-makers are within a firm.  Unions rely on researchers to 
unveil concealed corporate actors.  Second, corporate campaigns need to develop tactics that 
pressure key decision-makers beyond the workplace.  Leverage-based tactics at the site of 
production--such as strikes--rarely remain adequate to bring management to the negotiating table 
in the twenty-first century.  Unions need to leverage employers on multiple levels.  Third, 
strategic campaigns enable unions to stay one step ahead of management and force key decision-
makers on the defensive.  Campaigns have no blueprint and face few regulations, which allow 
unions to develop innovative strategies that companies fail to foresee.  While a financial power 
imbalance exists between unions and corporations, researchers and campaigners can defeat 
managers through creativity and innovative ideas.  Unions need to research and develop creative 
tactics that target ultimate decision-makers, or they will continue to lose ground as a result of 
changing structures brought about by neoliberal globalization.
 Strategic research unveils key decision-makers who often remain hidden behind complex 
corporate structures.  The unwavering desire to enhance workplace flexibility has led employers 
to develop obscured ownership structures.  Furthermore, the rapid development of 
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financialization under neoliberalism has led to the creation of many private equity firms that hold 
a controlling stake in many companies.  The Ravenswood campaign, Justice for Janitors, and the 
UAW’s recent struggles prove the necessity of strategic research to uncover key decision-makers. 
At Ravenswood, workers had no idea that the key actors pulling decision-making strings lived 
across the Atlantic Ocean in Switzerland.  The USW uncovered RAC’s obscured corporate 
structure, which enabled the union to escalate pressure on the real decision-makers.  In the J for J 
campaign, SEIU’s research team discovered that building owners maintained as much decision-
making power as janitorial employers.  Escalated tactics that interfered with building owner’s 
growth plans in downtown L.A. enabled the union to achieve victory.  Conversely, the CWA’s 
unfamiliarity with the trucking industry created major obstacles to the success of the 1996 port 
truckers’ strike.  The CWA failed to understand the industry, which ultimately doomed the port 
truckers’ campaign.
 Strategic corporate campaigns develop multiple pressure tactics that leverage employers 
beyond the workplace.  All of the campaigns--both successes and failures--studied in this paper 
attempted to pressure employers beyond the site of production.  The unions involved in these 
case studies combined workplace activities with campaigns that targeted a vast array of company 
interests that appeared irrelevant to the ongoing labor dispute.  Successful campaigns pressured 
multiple decision-makers from a variety of angles.  Both the USW at Ravenswood and the SEIU 
in L.A. devised strategies that weakened the financial status and reputation of major actors 
involved.  In contrast, the AIU and UPIU at A.E. Staley failed to develop a strategic campaign 
that targeted multiple key decision-makers at the same time.  The union put too many resources 
into campaigning against Staley customers on an individualized basis.  Similarly, the CWA 
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developed an innovative tactic during the port truckers’ campaign, but placed the fate of the 
entire campaign into a single strategy.  The CWA’s failure to construct a multifaceted campaign--
which largely resulted from the union’s limited understanding of the trucking industry--played a 
large role in the port truckers’ defeat.
 Strategic campaigns place the union a step ahead of management and enable researchers 
and campaigners to overcome financial imbalances through creativity and innovative tactics.  
Many union researcher believe that they can defeat any company one-on-one because managers 
respond quite slowly to innovative union tactics, which change with every campaign.  The lack 
of a blueprint and regulations governing corporate campaigns enable unions to confront 
management on a creative and ideological terrain, rather than engaging in a purely financial and 
institutionalized struggle.  The development of a strategic campaign represents an art form that 
forces unions to think creatively and devise strategies that take management completely by 
surprise.  The USW’s success at Ravenswood and the SEIU’s victory in the L.A. J for J 
campaign both illustrate the importance of innovative and creative strategies.  On the other hand, 
the UAW’s failure to stay one step ahead of management arguably played a role in the union’s 
defeat in the NLRB election.  The UAW achieved neutrality with VW, but they failed to pressure 
VW to adhere to the neutrality agreement and lacked an effective response to the coordinated and 
targeted conservative campaign immediately prior to the election.  
Broad Implications
 I have explained why unions need strategic research and corporate campaigns to maintain 
relevance in the twenty-first century.  I have also shown that the financial costs of undertaking 
such a campaign--if done correctly--do not appear as high as many scholars and unionists claim.  
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However, the development of a unionism based on strategic research and corporate campaigns 
face tremendous obstacles that need to be considered and problematized.  No institutional 
arrangements govern corporate campaigns.  Unions cannot automatically extend campaign 
victories to other parts of the same sector.  For example, a union may invest five years and 
develop sophisticated campaign tactics into an organizing drive that, if successful, unionizes one-
hundred or so workers.  The arduous struggle and eventual victory is extremely admirable and 
potentially life-fulfilling, but organizing one-hundred workers over five years of time and 
resources does not represent a replicable form of unionism.  And this scenario assumes victory, 
which is far from guaranteed.  
 Unions find it difficult to make progress on such a localized case-by-case and time-
consuming basis.  As stated before, researchers believe that they can defeat any employer one-
on-one, but cannot assume that such victories will occur rapidly.  Some organizing victories set a 
precedent for the rest of an industry.  For example, successful organizing at a hospital that has 
implemented a new model of employment relations may lead to easier organization of other 
hospitals that have adopted the same model.  Such a form of unionism still maintains significant 
discrepancies from the industry-wide bargaining common of the Fordist era, where employers 
often organized for unions.
 Strategic research and corporate campaigns do not appear to address the systemic 
problems facing American organized labor.  Unions cannot expect to make significant progress 
by organizing a single employer at a time in a globalized and rapidly transforming economy.  
Many industrial relations scholars believe that unless a type of economy develops in which 
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employers favor unionization, unions require state interference to support organizing drives.121  
Unions need the state to construct an institutional arrangement that supports harmonious labor 
relations within a specific political economy.  Regulation theorists argue that institutions are 
needed to stabilize capitalism--an inherently unstable and crisis-ridden system.122  In the current 
context of capital hostility towards a relatively weak labor movement, only the state can develop 
institutions to regulate capitalism.  Unions no longer maintain enough power to develop 
bargaining institutions without state involvement.  
 These institutions match to a particular type of economic growth and succeed at 
stabilizing capitalism for a few decades.  For example, the Wagner Act constructed an 
institutional arrangement governing labor relations that remained very applicable to the Fordist 
regime of accumulation.  Regulation theory assumes that the state will reform or erect new 
institutions to adapt to changing regimes of accumulation, or else face an eventual crisis.  Once 
Fordism collapsed and transitioned to neoliberalism, the state failed to develop a new type of 
labor relations system, and the NLRB became increasingly unable to meet its original goal of 
fostering union organizing.  The 2008 recession--the crisis that was supposed to encourage state 
regulation--did not bring about significant transformations in American industrial relations, 
partially because American workers did not struggle to nearly the same extent as during the 
Great Depression.
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 Inherently weak labor unions need state support to maintain power in a capitalist 
economy.  In France, unions only represented 7.8% of workers as of 2010,123 but collective 
bargaining agreements cover over 90% percent of French employees.  The French state provides 
this coverage extension.  The Employee Free Choice Act represents a potential example of state 
support of organizing rights.  EFCA would have institutionalized card check and helped adapt the 
original goals of the NLRB to modern economic realities.  Congress eventually defeated EFCA 
multiple times.  The obvious problem for American unions is that state support remains virtually 
nonexistent in the twenty-first century.  With a weak labor movement and lack of state support, 
how do workers develop power?
 Industrial relations experts who believe that inherently weak labor organizations need 
state support may argue that unions need to tie themselves to the state through a political party.  
For example, unions forged ties with Social-Democratic parties in both Sweden and Britain, 
where corporatist institutions developed most prominently under Fordism.  American Unions 
have had a long--albeit inconsistent and sometimes contentious--relationship with the 
Democratic party.  Many scholars and activists today believe that the Democratic party remains 
indistinguishable from the Republican party in terms of support for corporate interests.  
Organized labor no longer maintains the political clout they once possessed through higher 
density rates.  Furthermore, if Democrats--at least on the national scene--rarely support 
organized labor’s agenda, then unions should not waste resources on political lobbying when 
organizing and research departments remain underfunded.  Unless unions form a social 
movement pact with a variety of other progressive organizations--such as environmental and 
82
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immigrant rights groups--to pressure the Democrats from the left, unions cannot rely on the state 
to extend support for structural labor relations reform.
 Strategic research and corporate campaigns serve as essential components of union 
strategy because they are necessary components of achieving long-lasting grassroots power.  If 
the state cannot extend protections to an already weak labor movement, then unions need to help 
foster counter-hegemonic grassroots struggle.  An emphasis on grassroots power does not 
indicate that union staff play no role.  A mixture of top-down and bottom-up processes is 
required to foster true grassroots empowerment.  Any movement that seeks to gain more relative 
power at the expense of transnational corporate interests requires strategy and organization.  
Strategic research and corporate campaigns neutralize some of the unbalanced resource 
discrepancies between labor and capital.  Strategic tactics enhance the strength of collective 
action by enabling workers’ organizations to pressure transnational corporations beyond a 
localized site of a labor dispute or community struggle.  Antiglobalization movements--including 
labor activists that emphasize a grassroots unionism--have developed localized struggles and 
solutions to an increasingly transnational opposition.  These decentralized struggles empower 
exploited individuals, but only widen the power discrepancy between global neoliberal actors 
and decentralized resistance groups.  Strategic campaigns that leverage exploiters beyond the 
localized site of struggle need to accompany grassroots movements.
 In conclusion, strategic research and corporate campaigns emphasize the importance of 
ideas and creativity when confronting neoliberal capital.  These campaigns enable unions to 
compete against employers on nonmaterial grounds where financial resources play a less 
significant role.  The unregulated nature of strategic campaigns also provides a source of 
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empowerment for unions.  Unions should continue to experiment with creative strategies that 
leverage employers beyond the workplace.  As the campaigns in this paper show, 
experimentation may possibly lead to a new form of unionism that confronts employers on an 
innovative and strategic level.  Researchers and campaigners need to exist in continuous creative 
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